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by circuit.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether software replicated abroad from a master
version exported from the United States—with the intent that it be
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replicated—may be deemed ‘supplied’ from the United States for
purposes of [patent infringement].” Id. at 1369.
ANALYSIS: In interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2005), a patent
infringement statute attaching liability for supplying “in or from the
United States all or substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention” to “induce” the assembly of such components abroad, the
Federal Circuit focused on congressional intent. Id. at 1371. The court
stated, “Congress enacted § 271(f) in response to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)
that exposed a loophole in § 271 that allowed potential infringers to
avoid liability by manufacturing the components of patented products in
the United States and then shipping them abroad for assembly.” Id. Here,
Microsoft did not export components of an invention; it sent abroad one
master version of software for mass reproduction. Id. at 1369. The court
held that § 271(f) must be interpreted broadly to cover Microsoft’s
actions because § 271(f) was enacted to expand § 271’s scope to any
situation where foreign infringement is accommodated by acts occurring
within the United States. Id. 1371.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held, “For software ‘components,’
the act of copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ such that
sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) liability for those foreign made copies.” Id. at 1370.
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether § 117(c) of the Copyright Act shields an
entity from liability for copyright infringement when a copy of software
onto RAM is necessary for a machine to function.
ANALYSIS: Although § 117(c) requires the immediate destruction
of the copy made after “maintenance or repair” is completed, the term
“maintenance” as defined in § 117(d) implies an ongoing process. Id. at
1312. Thus, although a company may continually work with a system, it
need not reboot and destroy the copy made until its maintenance contract
has lapsed. Id. at 1312-13. Further, the copy is only allowed to be made
if it is necessary for the machine to be turned on. Id. at 1314. If code
designed for maintenance is so entangled with functional code, its
copying is permitted by § 117(c). Id. at 1314.
CONCLUSION: § 117(c) of the Copyright Act shields an entity from
liability for copyright infringement when a copy of the software is made
for maintenance purposes. See id. at 1312-15.

2005]

First Impressions

177

Wilson ex rel. Estate of Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether defendant has jurisdiction to bring a claim in
the United States Court of Federal Claims to recover payment made to
Medicare on the grounds that the government’s claim against the estate
was an illegal exaction.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that, although the Tucker Act
allows a person to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims for the
recovery of monies paid to the government on the grounds that it was
improperly paid, an illegal exaction claim may not be brought in the
Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act “when ‘Congress has
expressly placed jurisdiction elsewhere.’” Id. at 1009 (quoting
Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1996)). The court stated that “‘all aspects of . . . claim[s] for benefits
should be channeled first into the administrative process which Congress
has provided for the determination of claims for benefits.’” Id. at 1012
(quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605 (1984)). The court held
that defendant’s claim is a benefits claim since she is effectively
demanding recovery of an overpayment of benefits by Medicare and,
therefore, the claim arises under the Medicare Act. Id. at 1013. The court
noted consistencies in its ruling with two circuits. Id. at 1013-16.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the claim of illegal exaction was
a benefits claim and, as such, arose under the Medicare Act, which
required defendant to pursue the claim under the administrative and
judicial channels of the Act.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1995)
QUESTION: “Whether the IRS was entitled to offset the erroneous
interest paid to PG&E in 1988 against amounts due and owing PG&E on
a subsequent refund relating to the same tax year when the government
could not have maintained a suit for such erroneous interest due to the
expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 1378.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a “tax deficiency, tax penalty, and
deficiency interest . . . are all components of a taxpayer’s liability.” Id. at
1382. “Therefore, these components are taken into account in
determining whether an overpayment exists and permitting them to offset
a claimed refund is logical.” Id. at 1383. However, “[s]tatutory interest is
[not] a part of, or even related to a taxpayer’s tax liability.” Id.
Significantly, the “tax code provides an integrated and comprehensive
scheme for assessing, collecting, and refunding taxes, deficiency interest,
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and penalties.” The court then stated that to permit an offset under these
circumstances would go outside “this well-tailored statutory scheme.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the “Service’s ability
to offset erroneously paid statutory interest against a taxpayer’s refund
claim in the same tax year is subject to the same statute of limitations
that applies to suits by the United States to recover refunds of taxes or
erroneous payments.” Id. at 1384.
Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: Should a statute, which prohibits the marking of an
unpatented product with the word “patent” for the purpose of deceiving
the public, be interpreted as a strict liability statute requiring “all actual
mismarking[s] to be subject to . . . [a] civil fine?” Id. at 1352.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the precedent of other circuits
supported a finding that “where one ‘has an honest, though mistaken,
belief that upon a proper construction it covers the article which he
marks,’ the requisite intent to deceive the public would not be shown.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: Being that the statute itself called for the intent to
deceive and that there were objective criteria in place for a court to find
such intent, and based on the precedent of other circuits, the Federal
Circuit held that the statute required a plaintiff to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the party accused of false marking
did not have a reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked.”
Id.
Harris Corp. v. Ericsson, Inc., 417 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “it is permissible to use a blended royalty rate
when all of the infringement for which damages are available took place
after the lower rate would come into effect.” Id. at 1257.
ANALYSIS: Relying on the court’s reasoning in Wang Laboratories
v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993), Harris argued that
royalty rates used to establish damages are tied to the first date of
infringement regardless of subsequent events. Id. Therefore, where the
first infringement occurred in January 1992, the statutory damages period
in which damages were available began and the royalty rates applicable
in 1992 should be used to calculate damages. Id. On the other hand,
Ericsson argued that under Wang the court could rely on subsequent
events to the first infringement in determining the royalty rates used to
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calculate damages. Id. Therefore, where Ericsson received notice of the
patent in August 1998, the statutory damages period in which damages
were available did not begin until August 1998, and the low royalty rate
should apply. Id.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the district court
correctly understood that Wang allowed for consideration of subsequent
events, but was in error where it blended the royalty rate applicable
during 1992-1997 and the low royalty rate applicable beginning in
January 1997 to calculate damages. Id. The rate to apply is the one that
would have been in effect during the period in which damages were
available. Id. at 1258. In this case, damages would not have been
available until August 1998, in which the low rate applied. Id. at 1258.
Britton v. Office of Compliance, 412 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether 2 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and section 1.03 of the
Office of Compliance’s Rules of Procedure mean that the thirty-day time
limit for petitions for review of decisions of the Hearing Officer is
measured from the date of entry of the decision or from the date the
petitioner receives the decision.” Id. at 1328.
ANALYSIS: The court, agreeing with the defendant Board,
explained that “§ 1406(a) requires a petition for review to be filed a
maximum of thirty days from ‘the date that the hearing officer’s decision
is entered into the Office’s record’ not the date of ‘the service of a mailed
notice or document on a person or party.’ By its clear language, section
1.03(c)’s extensions of time apply to a different class of deadlines –
those based on a party’s receipt of a document. They plainly do not . . .
apply to ‘every prescribed period set forth in the statute and Procedural
Rules.’ Furthermore, although the immediately preceding section 1.03(b)
applies to ‘any action required or permitted under these rules,’ the Rules
contain no suggestion that section 1.03(c) has the same scope.” Id. at
1330.
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the Board’s interpretation of
the applicable law and its resulting conclusion. Thus, it affirmed the
Board’s dismissal. Id.
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, LTD., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: Whether a sale of a patent-infringing method can occur
in the United States, even if the actual method occurs outside the United
States. Id. at 1318.
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ANALYSIS: Research in Motion (RIM), makers of the Blackberry
wireless email device, were sued for patent infringement by NTP, Inc.,
who patented the first wireless email system. Id. at 1288-89. NTP
claimed under § 271(a) of the Patent Act that RIM’s use of a wireless
email system infringed on its method patent, but the Federal Circuit
reasoned that because RIM was located in Canada, the use of the method
was beyond the reach of § 271(a). Id. at 1318.
NTP then claimed that the sale of that method within the United
States was enough, even though the method itself was beyond the Act’s
reach. Id. The Federal Circuit disagreed because Congress intended that
method claims could only be infringed by use, not sales. However the
court limited its holding to the facts of the case stating “we need not and
do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the ‘sells’ and
offers to sell’ prongs of section 271(a).” Id. at 1320-21.
CONCLUSION: RIM’s use of a patented method as a service to its
customers cannot be considered selling of the method under §271(a). Id.
at 1321.
D.C. CIRCUIT
Goldring v. Dist. of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act’s (“IDEA”) “fee-shifting provision enables a prevailing party to
recover expert fees as part of his costs . . . .” Id. at 73.
ANALYSIS: Parents of disabled children sued the District of
Columbia Public Schools for violations of IDEA. Id. at 71. After being
granted summary judgment, plaintiffs appealed in order to recover the
costs of obtaining experts under § 1415, which allows the recovery of
“reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id. The D.C. Circuit quoted the Supreme
Court decision Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437,
439 (1987), which found that “when a prevailing party seeks
reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court
is bound by the limit of [section] 1821(b), absent contract or explicit
statutory authority to the contrary.” Id. at 72. Analogizing Crawford, the
D.C. Circuit found that there was no “explicit statutory authority” in the
IDEA to lead to the conclusion that expert fees were recoverable costs.
Id. at 73.
CONCLUSION: The IDEA’s fee-shifting provision does not allow
the prevailing party to recover expert fees as part of the award of
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 71.
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Booker v. Robert Half Int’l., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “enforcing the remainder of [an] arbitration
clause contravenes the federal policy interest in ensuring the effective
vindication of statutory rights” when the arbitration agreement contains a
provision that “requires the claimant to forgo substantive rights.” Id. at
79.
ANALYSIS: Booker claimed that “responding to illegal provisions in
arbitration agreements by judicially pruning them out leaves employers
with every incentive to ‘overreach’ when drafting such agreements.” Id.
at 84. The D.C. Circuit found that “[i]f illegality pervades the arbitration
agreement such that only a disintegrated fragment would remain after
hacking away the unenforceable parts . . . the judicial effort begins to
look more like rewriting the contract than fulfilling the intent of the
parties.” Id. at 84-85. In addition, the court stated, “the more the
employer overreaches, the less likely a court will be able to sever the
provisions and enforce the clause, a dynamic that creates incentives
against the very overreaching Booker fears.” Id. at 85. “Not only does
the agreement [under review] contain a severability clause, but Booker
identifies only one discrete illegal provision in the agreement.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit concluded that “[t]he existence of
an express severability clause in the agreement, the fact that the
agreement is otherwise valid and enforceable, and a ‘healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration,’ lead us to affirm the decision
below, severing the ban on punitive damages and compelling
arbitration.” Id. at 79.
FIRST CIRCUIT
United States v. Alvarez-Cuevas, 415 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the enhancement in [USSG] § 2A4.1(b)(6)
applies when a fellow conspirator in the hostage taking has retained the
taken child in his or her custody and the consideration received is no
more than the conspirator’s expected share of the ransom.” Id. at 122.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit looked to the legislative history of the
statute and found that the enhancement was “geared to the crime of
kidnapping, not hostage taking.” Id. at 125-26. Additionally, the court
reasoned that the enhancement “most easily fits a kidnap-for-hire
situation,” where the kidnapper “never intends to return the child to her
original home.” Id. at 126. Finally, the court found that an interpretation
that would enhance the sentence of criminals, like the defendant, would
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create an “incentive for kidnappers to hide or even to abandon children”
to avoid the enhancement. Id. at 127.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit found that the enhancement in
USSG § 2A4.1(b)(6) is not applicable “when a fellow conspirator in the
hostage taking has retained the taken child in his or her custody and the
consideration received is no more than the conspirator’s expected share
of the ransom.” Id. at 122.
United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a state trooper’s protective sweep of
defendant’s house which was incident to his arrest immediately outside
defendant’s house was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Maryland v. Buie, which held that an exception to the general rule that
a search must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment exists where
“articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the
arrest scene.” Id. at 41 (quoting Maryalnd v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334
(1990)). Additionally, the search must be limited to ‘‘a cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.’’ Id. (quoting
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335). The court noted that Buie placed significance on
“the risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home” due to the
possibility of third parties in the home. Id. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at
336). Accordingly, the court determined that an arrest immediately
outside the home can pose the same threat. Id. Therefore, the court held
that the officer’s entry and search of the home were cursory and
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Id. at 42. The court
acknowledged that other circuits have allowed protective sweeps to be
made in this fashion. Id.
CONCLUSION: The protective sweep of defendant’s house was
lawful under the Fourth Amendment since there existed the danger of a
third person in the house and the search was cursory.
In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: The issue facing the court was the proper and precise
scope of 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2), “which provides an exception to the rule
of public access to papers filed in a bankruptcy case for material that is
‘scandalous or defamatory’” Id. at 1.
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ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit began by noting that § 107 “establishes
a broad right of public access, subject only to limited exceptions set forth
in the statute, to all papers filed in a bankruptcy case.” Id. at 3. In
attempting to define “defamatory matter[s],” the court found the face of
the statute and its legislative history failed to provide a sufficient
definition, leaving the court “to determine the specific contours of the
exception.” Id. at 11. In furtherance of the policy of § 107(a), the court
held that “a party may seek protection under § 107(b)(2) based on
potentially untrue information that would alter his reputation in the eyes
of a reasonable person.” Id. at 12. Turning to “case law and . . .
interpretation[s] of sources analogous to § 107(b)(2),” the 1st Circuit
went on to find that protection could only be granted where it can be
shown that the “information would . . . be irrelevant [or] included for
improper ends.” Id. at 13-14.
CONCLUSION: “To qualify for protection under the § 107(b)(2)
exception for defamatory material, an interested party must show (1) that
the material at issue would alter his reputation in the eyes of a reasonable
person, and (2) that the material is untrue or that it is potentially untrue
and irrelevant or included for an improper end.” Id. at 16.
Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 412 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether TILA [the Truth in Lending Act] permits a
damages claim to be stated by the debtor under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 based
on the creditor’s alleged failure to respond properly to the debtor’s notice
of rescission.” Id. at 19.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit reviewed the relevant provisions of
TILA as well as the purpose of that statute. TILA primarily requires
disclosure. Id. at 25. Although rescission is not a remedy for a TILA
violation, it may be sought in an action along with actual damages and
the statutory penalty. Id. at 24, n.2. If a creditor has not disclosed
necessary information, after the receipt of a valid notice of recission, that
creditor has violated a disclosure requirement of TILA and is liable for
damages pursuant to § 1640. Id. at 25. Furthermore, rescission is meant
to be a private process. Id. “The potential for damages (including
penalties and attorney’s fees) creates incentives for creditors to rescind
mortgages when faced with valid requests without forcing debtors to
resort to the courts, for such resort causes substantial delay and expense
to debtors.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that TILA does permit a
damages claim under § 1640 based on the creditor’s alleged failure to
respond properly to the debtor’s notice of rescission. Id. at 19.
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United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: When a court violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights through the mandatory application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, is the proper remedy: (1) to remand for resentencing, or (2) to solicit an advisory opinion from the judge in error
regarding whether or not the judge’s mistaken belief about the mandatory
application of the Guidelines affected the sentence the judge otherwise
would have given to the defendant? Id. at 490
ANALYSIS: In United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), the
Supreme Court held in part that the imposition of a mandatory Federal
Guidelines sentence made “on the basis of judge-found facts” was
unconstitutional as a violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Id. at 489. The 1st Circuit held that these cases are to
be remanded for re-sentencing, so long as the government is unable to
meet its burden showing that the error “did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights” beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that defendant’s
constitutional rights had been violated and that the government had not
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not affect
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 491. The court then remanded for
re-sentencing rather than following the advisory approached based on the
court’s belief that there would not “be so many such cases that
reconvening sentencing hearing will create a significant administrative
burden.” Id.
El Dia, Inc. v. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110 (1st Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: Whether a bond requirement for nonresident
advertisers is a valid restriction on commercial speech under the 1st
Amendment. Id. at 114.
ANALYSIS: Dismissing other cases, the 1st Circuit stated that the
framework set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), is the proper test to use when determining
whether the bond requirements for nonresident advertisers impermissibly
violates the advertiser’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 114. The 1st
Circuit found that the Puerto Rico bond requirement fails the second and
third prongs of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 115. The second prong
states, “a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
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and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”
Id. at 115 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)). The
bond requirement also failed the third prong which requires that the
“‘speech restrictions be narrowly drawn.’” Id. at 117 (quoting Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565).
CONCLUSION: Under the test set forth in Central Hudson, a bond
requirement restricting an advertiser’s commercial speech must 1)
demonstrate that harms are real, 2) show that the restrictions will lessen
those harms and 3) be narrowly tailored. In this case the bond
requirement failed. Id. at 117-18.
United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the combined sentence of years of
imprisonment plus years of supervised release may exceed the statutory
maximum number of years of imprisonment authorized by the
substantive statute applicable to the crime of conviction.” Id. at 489.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit explained that a “sentence” in a broad
sense of the term consists of several parts, including incarceration, fines,
term of supervised release, or special monetary assessment. Id. Each part
of the “sentence” is evaluated separately; therefore, the aggregate time in
which the sentence is imposed on the guilty party may exceed the
maximum number of years authorized for imprisonment. Id. The court
followed the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in this holding. Id.
at 489-90. The 1st Circuit stated that “the permissible term of
incarceration authorized for a supervised release violation is not
circumscribed by the substantive sentence called for under the federal
guidelines,” and therefore the sentence is upheld. Id. at 490.
CONCLUSION: “When determining whether a sentence exceeds the
maximum permissible under the Constitution, each aspect of the sentence
must be analyzed separately.” Id. at 490.
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: When is it proper to apply the Lanham Act
extraterritorially? Id. at 110.
ANALYSIS: “Congress has little reason to assert jurisdiction over
foreign defendants who are engaging in activities that have no substantial
effect on the United States, and courts, absent an express statement from
Congress, have no good reason to go further in such situations.” Id. at
120. “[W]e first ask whether the defendant is an American citizen, and if
he is not, then we use the substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to
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determine jurisdiction.” Id. at 121. “The substantial effects test requires
that there be evidence of impacts within the United States, and these
impacts must be of a sufficient character and magnitude to give the
United States a reasonably strong interest in the litigation.” Id. at 120.
CONCLUSION: “We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only
where the conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce.
Absent a showing of such a substantial effect, at least as to foreign
defendants, the court lacks jurisdiction over the Lanham Act claim.” Id.
at 120.
SECOND CIRCUIT
United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant can be convicted of using a
facility in interstate commerce with the intent that a murder-for-hire be
committed when the defendant’s usage of that facility is wholly
intrastate.” Id. at 303.
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that circuits are split on whether
“the actual use by the defendant must be an interstate one” to support a
finding that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b)(2005) by “using a facility of
interstate commerce” to commit murder-for-hire. Id. at 303-304. The
court noted that the 5th and 7th Circuits hold that the statute is satisfied
“irrespective of whether the particular usage in question was itself
interstate or intrastate, so long as the facility is one involved in interstate
commerce.” Id. at 304. On the other hand, the court pointed out that the
6th Circuit held that an intrastate usage does not establish jurisdiction
even where the facility used is an interstate one. Id. The court found the
5th and 7th Circuits’ approach more consistent with the statutory
language. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a defendant can be
convicted under § 1958(b) for using an interstate commerce facility to
commit murder-for-hire in a totally intrastate fashion. See id. at 305.
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [National Bank Act] NBA and [the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] OCC regulations preempt
state banking laws concerning operating subsidiaries of nationally
chartered banks.” Id at 309.
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ANALYSIS: “The NBA grants powers to national banks, including
‘incidental powers’ necessary to carry on the business of banking . . . and
it provides that national banks, in the exercise of their powers, shall be
free from state ‘visitorial’ power . . . . The OCC, meanwhile, has issued
regulations allowing national banks to conduct business through an
operating subsidiary . . . and providing that ‘State laws apply to national
bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to
the parent national bank . . . .’ These regulations define a national bank’s
‘incidental powers’ to include conducting business through an operating
subsidiary, and they preempt state visitorial power over operating
subsidiaries to enable national banks to exercise this incidental power.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the NBA and OCC preempt state
banking laws in this context and that the court will “defer to these
regulations because they are reasonable within the OCC’s authority
under the NBA.” Id.
United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s state youthful offender
adjudications can be used in determining whether the defendant is a
Career Offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Id. at 258
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that “a defendant will be
considered a ‘Career Offender’ under the Guidelines if the following
three prongs are satisfied.” Id. at 260. First, was the defendant “at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction?” Id. Second, was “the instant offense of
conviction” a “felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense?” Id. Third, does the defendant have “at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.” Id.
The court defined a “prior felony conviction” as being “a prior
adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by . . .
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Id. at 260-61. A
conviction occurring before the age of eighteen can be deemed an adult
conviction “if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 261. The court
also stated that “a federal sentencing court can consider youthful
offender adjudications” in its deliberations for sentencing. Id.
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CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court determined that it is proper to
use youthful offender adjudications in determining the Career Offender
status of the defendant. Id. at 256.
Sepulveda v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars the courts of
appeals from reviewing orders from the Board of Immigration Appeals
that denied a motion to reopen petitioner’s removal proceedings and an
order which denied a motion to reconsider that order.
ANALYSIS: The court introduced the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B) (1996), which provides that ‘‘no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
section[s] . . . of this title.’’ Id. at 62 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). Despite the plain language, the court relied on
precedent demonstrating the “‘strong presumption in favor of judicial
review of administrative action.’” Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S.
289, 298 (2001)). The court also noted that its decision followed that of
other circuits which similarly held that the statute does not bar judicial
review. Id. at 63. Finally, the court followed a principal that “because a
final order of removal is intertwined with subsequent motions to
reconsider and reopen those removal proceedings, a jurisdictional
provision that applies to a final order of removal necessarily [] applies to
related motions to reconsider and reopen.” Id. at 64. Accordingly, the
court held that judicial review of these orders was proper. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
does not prohibit [the] [c]ourt from reviewing [the] orders because the
determinations to deny [petitioner] eligibility for relief under §§ 1229b
and 1255(i) were nondiscretionary.” Id. at 61.
In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192 (2d. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether unpaid contributions are ‘assets’ of an
ERISA plan.” Id. at 1198.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the plain meaning of the word
“asset” which revealed that the central point of the definition is that “the
person or entity holding the asset has an ownership interest in a given
thing, whether tangible or intangible.” Id. at 1199. Next, in determining
ownership interests, the court looked at common law property principles
and held that a future interest exists in the plan “in the collection of the
contractually-owed contributions.” Id. Under the First Restatement, “a
future interest in property is “‘an interest . . . which is not, but may
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become a present interest.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (First) of Property
§ 153(1)(a) (1936)). In this particular case, the court held that the
contractual interest to collect the unpaid contributions represents a future
interest in the plan and, by application of the Restatement, qualifies as a
present interest. Id. Therefore, the unpaid contributions are “assets” of
the ERISA plan. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the contractual right to collect
unpaid contributions represents a present interest in the plan and,
therefore, qualifies as an “asset” of an ERISA plan.
In re Siemon, 421 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the time limit imposed by Rule 8002(a) [of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure] is in fact jurisdictional . . . .”
Id. at 169.
ANALYSIS: Answering in the affirmative, the 2nd Circuit cited
three reasons in support of its decision. First, the court pointed to a
number of district court cases that had treated the rule as jurisdictional.
Id. Second, the court cited sister courts that had come to the same
determination. Id. Finally, the court noted that “[t]he advisory
committee’s note to Rule 8002(a) states that the rule is an ‘adaptation’ of
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure [and that] it is . . .
well established that the time limit prescribed by [Rule] 4(a) is
‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Id. (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court followed its “sister circuits in
holding that the time limit contained in Rule 8002(a) is jurisdictional,
and that, in the absence of a timely notice of appeal in the district court,
the district court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, regardless
of whether the appellant can demonstrate ‘excusable neglect.’” Id.
Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether public employers are exempt from the
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act].” Id. at 254.
ANALYSIS: The court followed the 3rd Circuit reasoning on this
issue by noting that “the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge’ an individual because of his or her
age.” Id. at 255. The court found that “[b]ecause state and municipal
entities are expressly included within the ADEA definition of an
‘employer,’… the statute ‘could not be more explicit in imposing
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liability for age discrimination against municipalities’ and agencies
thereof.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded “that the plaintiffs have a right
to recover liquidated damages for this willful discrimination from the
Transit Authority because the ADEA authorizes such damages against
public as well as private employers.” Id. at 259.
605 Park Garage Assoc., LLC v. 605 Apartment Corp., 412 F.3d 304
(2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a cooperative may terminate a lease entered
into by a sponsor (or its affiliate) prior to the [the Condominium and
Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse] Relief Act’s effective
date, where two lease renewal options contained in that lease were
exercised after the Act’s effective date.” Id. at 305.
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[s]ince the exercise of a lease
renewal option does not create a new lease under New York law, and
since the Garage Lease was executed before October 8, 1980, the plain
language of the Relief Act dictates that the Garage Lease may not be
terminated under that Act.” Id. at 306. “Moreover, application of the
Relief Act in the manner the Cooperative urges would implicate
retroactivity concerns.” Id. (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION: The court asserted that “federal courts will apply a
statute retroactively only where provided with a clear articulation of
congressional intent, which is lacking here.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
the court held that the Relief Act provided no such termination right and
affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of the sponsor. Id. at 305-06.
United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether § 2G2.2 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, providing for a computer-use enhancement if “a computer
was used for the transmission of the material,” applies to an individual
whose act of transporting for which he has been convicted entails
physically carrying a CD from one state to another, “an act that
concededly [does] not involve the use of a computer.” Id. at 349.
ANALYSIS: Finding a recent 3rd Circuit ruling on this issue
persuasive, the 2nd Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit’s assertion that
“[t]he language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) is specifically targeted toward ‘the
material’ and not ‘the offense,’ as are other portions of § 2G2.2. The
application of the enhancement, therefore, does not hinge on whether the
defendant used a computer to commit ‘the offense’ for which he was

2005]

First Impressions

191

convicted. Instead, the enhancement hinges on ‘the material’ implicated
in the offense, and whether this material had at some point been
transmitted using a computer.” Id. (quoting United States v. Harrison,
357 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004)). The court also found that policy reasons
strongly favor application of the enhancement. Id. The court articulated
that “[a]pplication of the enhancement where a computer was used in
transmitting the pornographic materials underlying the offense . . . serves
to punish more severely what has been recognized as more dangerous
behavior.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Accordingly, the court found that the lower court
had properly applied § 2G2.2 “to the act of transporting a CD whose
manner of creation – downloading – involved ‘use of a computer.’” Id.
United States v. Amante, 418 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court may bifurcate a single-count
felon-in-possession trial absent the government’s consent.” Id. at 222.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a “bifurcation order…presents
the problem of forcing the jury to deliberate about the issue of
ammunition possession without knowing that the charged crime requires
a prior felony.” Id. at 224. In addition, the 1st, 4th, and 9th Circuits have
prohibited trial courts from bifurcating the elements of a single-count
felon-in-possession at trial. Id. at 223-24.
CONCLUSION: “[W]e hold that bifurcation of the elements of a
single-count felon-in-possession trial, absent the government’s consent,
is generally error.” Id. at 224.
Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: In cases brought under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, “whether a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging an immigration detention qualifies as a ‘civil
action.’” Id. at 664.
ANALYSIS: In Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107 (2d. Cir. 1984),
the 2nd Circuit had held that habeas petitions did not qualify as a “civil
action” under the EAJA. Id. at 667. The 2nd Circuit had recognized that
in enacting the EAJA, Congress was concerned where “the cost of
contesting a Government order, for example, exceeds the amount at
stake, a party has no realistic choice and no effective remedy.” Id. at 669670 (internal citations omitted). However, immigration habeas
challenges can be distinguished in part because “unlike criminal
defendants, persons in immigration proceedings are not provided with
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legal counsel.” Id. at 670. Finally, “the EAJA’s purpose of providing
financial encouragement to litigants is not sufficient to demonstrate that
Congress’s intent was to exclude habeas petitions in the immigration
context from the term ‘civil action[s].’” Id. at 671.
CONCLUSION: The court found that “a habeas proceeding
challenging immigration detentions constitutes a “civil action” under the
EAJA.” Id. at 672.
In re Simon II Litigation, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a court may certify “a mandatory, stand-alone
punitive damages class on the proposed ‘limited punishment’ theory” Id.
at 132.
ANALYSIS: The limited punishment theory is premised on the idea
that “there is a constitutional due process limitation on the total amount
of punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant for the
same offending conduct.” Id. at 134. It is the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which supplies this cap by prohibiting the
“‘imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor.’” Id. at 135. Theory aside, the 2nd Circuit noted that there are
definite conditions that must be satisfied in order to justify binding
absent class members. Id. at 137. The court stated that these conditions
were: “‘a fund with a definitely ascertainable limit, all of which would be
distributed to satisfy all those with liquidated claims based on a common
theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata distribution.’” Id.
CONCLUSION: Since the proposed cap under the ‘limited
punishment’ theory was merely theoretical, capped by the uncertain
boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the court
held that the amount of the fund under such a theory was not definitely
ascertainable; and thus, the theory could not be used by a court to certify
a mandatory punitive damages class. Id. at 138-40.
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether there is an exception to the rule that an action
sought to be enjoined is moot if the event at issue occurs. Id. at 509.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit explained that normally “the
occurrence of an action sought to be enjoined . . . moots the request for
preliminary injunctive relief because [the] Court has ‘no effective relief
to offer’ once the action has occurred.” Id. (quoting CMM Cable Rep.,
Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 621 (1st Cir. 1995)).
However, the court stated that if there is a situation in which the court
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can still grant effective relief by placing the parties back in the same
situation that they were in before the action occurred, the case is no
longer moot. Id. at 510.
CONCLUSION: If effective relief can still be granted by returning
the parties to the status quo before the action occurred then the case is
not moot and the court still has jurisdiction. Id.
Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether an Immigration Judge’s interpretation of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), which has been affirmed
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), is entitled to a deferential
standard of review under the Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
ANALYSIS: The BIA previously ruled that the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) provides
asylum for victims, or their spouses, of coercive family planning
policies. Id. at 186. The BIA, however, affirmed the decisions of
Immigration Judges (“IJ”) who denied asylum to the boyfriends and
fiancés of victims. Id. Before ruling on the facts, the 2nd Circuit
discussed whether those decisions should be afforded deference. It ruled
that the decisions should not because “were we to accord Chevron
deference to non-binding IJ statutory interpretations, we could find
ourselves in the impossible position of having to uphold as reasonable on
Tuesday one construction that is completely antithetical to another
construction we had affirmed as reasonable the Monday before.” Id. at
190.
CONCLUSION: “There is no reason to believe that an IJ’s summarily
affirmed decision contains the sort of authoritative and considered
statutory construction that Chevron deference was designed to honor.”
Id. at 191.
Wilson v. McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, prior to entering a guilty plea, a state
defendant must be informed that his sentence in state custody must be
served consecutively to, rather than concurrently with, a previously
imposed undischarged state sentence.” Id. at 198.
ANALYSIS: Wilson, a convicted felon, pled guilty to a charge of
attempted robbery in the second degree and was told by the court “that
he faced a term of 12 years to life.” Id. at 197. Later, Wilson moved to
withdraw his plea. He argued that his plea was not voluntary and
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intelligent because he was not informed that the sentence may run
consecutive to a prior conviction until after he entered his plea. Id.
Federal circuit courts have previously held that “federal courts need not
warn defendants prior to the entry of a plea that their federal sentences
may run consecutively to their state sentences.” Id. at 199. The court
reasoned that Wilson was informed at his plea “that the court intended to
sentence him to a prison term of 12 years to life, and that is precisely the
sentence that the court imposed.” Id. at 200. Additionally, the sentencing
court retained “discretion to impose a concurrent sentence if it
determine[d] that such a sentence would be ‘in the interest of justice,’”
but chose instead to implement consecutive sentences. Id. The court
found “that the prevailing rule that imposition of a federal sentence to
run consecutively to a state sentence is a collateral consequence of a plea
[that] may reasonably be extended to apply to imposition of consecutive
state sentences.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the state court’s failure to
inform Wilson at the time he pled guilty that he could receive a
consecutive sentence did not unreasonably apply the general principle of
Supreme Court law that a plea must be knowing, intelligent and
voluntary to be valid.” Id. at 200.
United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hat a proper venue is for an 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)
prosecution.” Id. at 277.
ANALYSIS: The defendant appealed from a conviction “of
advertising to receive, exchange or distribute child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (now designated § 2251(d)).” Id. at 272.
In “determining the suitability of a particular venue, [a court] ‘must
initially identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the
crime) and then discern the location of the commission of the criminal
acts.’” Id. at 278. The court found that the defendant’s acts “consist[] of
distinct parts which have different localities [that] may be tried where
any part can be proved to have been done.” Id. at 278. Although the
defendant posted to a chat room from his home in Kentucky, because the
posting was seen by an investigator in New York, the 2nd Circuit found
that the defendant’s conduct “nevertheless amounted to a continuing
offense committed in New York.” Id. at 279.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “‘venue is proper, both
under the Constitution and under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in any district in which such offense was begun, continued or
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completed.’” Therefore, in this case, the Southern District of New York
was a proper venue. Id. at 274.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, when pursuing an employment
discrimination claim in federal court, a federal employee may elect to
enforce only the liability determination of an EEOC ruling, while
seeking a de novo jury trial on the question of damages.” Id. at 289-90.
ANALYSIS: The plaintiff’s suit was founded on 42 U.S.C. § 200-e16(c) which has been interpreted by the courts as requiring a trial de
novo. Id. at 292 (citing Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
The court looked to other circuit, which held that while administrative
finds are admissible as evidence, they are not binding on the district
courts. Id. at 293.
CONCLUSION: “We hold that, when a federal employee comes to
court to challenge, in whole or in part, the administrative disposition of
his or her discrimination claims, the court must consider those claims de
novo, and is not bound by the results of the administrative process,
whether that process culminated in one administrative decision, or in two
or more decisions.” Id. at 294.
Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a District Court should abstain from a
Hague Convention Petition when a state court custody proceeding is
pending.” Id. at 202.
ANALYSIS: “It is clear that if the state proceeding is one in which
the petitioner has raised, litigated and been given a ruling on the Hague
Convention claims, any subsequent ruling by the federal court on these
same issues would constitute interference. It seems equally clear that, if
the state court in a custody proceeding does not have a Hague
Convention claim before it, an adjudication of such a claim by the
federal court would not constitute interference.” Id. at 203.
CONCLUSION: The court found that “it is consistent with this
purpose that it is the custody determination, not the Hague Convention
Petition, that should be held in abeyance if proceedings are going
forward in both state and federal courts.” Id.
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United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable
use of a minor can be attributed to other members of a conspiracy for
purposes of applying an enhancement under §3B1.4.” Id. at 248.
ANALYSIS: Pojilenko, a member of a criminal organization, and a
sixteen-year-old accomplice conspired to rob drug users during an
arranged drug transaction. Id. at 245. Pojilenko was sentenced pursuant
to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.4, applying the two-level
enhancement for use of a minor in the crime. Id. The Government argued
that Pinkerton conspiracy principles allowed Pojilenko’s sentence to
stand, but the 3rd Circuit disagreed, holding that “§ 3B1.4 ‘specifie[s]’
that ‘use of a minor’ enhancements be individualized, and thus not based
on the acts of co-conspirators.” Id. at 248.
CONCLUSION: The Pinkerton principles of co-conspiracy should
not be applied in the context of “use of a minor” in crimes for
determining the proper sentence. Id. at 249.
Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether an alien who prevailed on his petition for
asylum, but whose case was remanded to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), which has the authority to reverse that ruling, is
considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of obtaining attorneys’
fees. Id. at 208.
ANALYSIS: Johnson, the petitioner for asylum, a Liberian native
who was forced to serve in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia before
deserting, petitioned for asylum. Id. at 207. The BIA denied his petition,
saying that Johnson had “failed to show that he was persecuted on
account of his political opinion.” Id. On appeal the 3rd Circuit disagreed
and held that the BIA’s decision was “not supported by substantial
evidence” and remanded the case. Id. Johnson then moved for attorneys’
fees for the appeal and the 3rd Circuit decided that under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Schaefer, Johnson “secured the setting aside of an
erroneous BIA decision,” and was therefore entitled to attorneys’ fees.
Id. at 209.
CONCLUSION: “[A]n alien whose petition for review of a BIA
decision is granted by our Court and whose case is then remanded to the
BIA is a prevailing party under the EAJA, and may therefore be entitled
to attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 210.
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In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether contested fees “first disclosed in the interim
between confirmation and discharge,” thereby invoking § 506(b) rather
than § 524, allows for a private right of action. Id. at 455.
ANALYSIS: “Typically, challenges to creditor collection efforts
occur post-discharge, and thus arise under 11 U.S.C. § 524, which
governs the effect of bankruptcy discharges. . . . Under § 524(a)(2), a
discharge operates as an injunction against a broad array of creditor
efforts to collect debts as personal liabilities of the discharged debtor.”
Id. at 455-56. The court found § 524 case law in this and other circuits
persuasive and thus, applicable to § 506(b) claims. The court explained
that it saw “no reason why the rule should be different for actions
asserted under § 506(b) rather than § 524. The essence of the complaint
is the same regardless of when the alleged violation was disclosed . . . .”
Id. at 456.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded “that the decisions holding that
§ 105(a) does not authorize separate lawsuits as a remedy for bankruptcy
violations, though established in the § 524 context, are equally applicable
when the underlying complaint is grounded in § 506(b).” Id.
In re Thompson, 418 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a restitution order from a state criminal
prosecution for theft by deception, which directs payment to the fraud
victim, is exempt from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge . . . .” Id. at
363.
ANALYSIS: Thompson was convicted for fraudulently procuring
money for construction contracts, pled guilty to a lesser charge, and was
ultimately sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay restitution
to his victims. Id. at 364. During the pendency of his criminal case he
was given a discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy code. Id. at
363. Thompson claimed that his bankruptcy discharge wiped away his
restitution obligations, but the 3rd Circuit disagreed with his contentions.
Id. at 364. Instead, the court determined that the principles of federalism
and congressional intent governed the case of state-mandated restitution.
Id. at 367-68. History and tradition regarding the application of the
bankruptcy laws led the 3rd Circuit to conclude that congressional
silence on the matter “dictates that we not interfere with New Jersey’s
criminal restitution order.” Id. at 368.
CONCLUSION: If state law provides for criminal restitution, such
debts are not dischargeable under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: What factors should be considered in determining
where a refugee applicant has “last habitually resided,” for purposes of 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Id. at 241.
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff, an ethnic Serb living in Croatia was denied
refugee status at his deportation proceedings by an immigration judge.
Id. at 242-43. The judge issued a deportation order listing Serbia first,
then Croatia, as plaintiff’s deportation countries. Id. at 243. Plaintiff
claimed that he was a “stateless” refugee who had resided in Croatia but
now has nowhere safe to return. Id. at 244-45. On review, the 3rd Circuit
noted that although the Immigration and Naturalization Act did not
define the term “last habitually resided,” it was appropriate for the
immigration judge to consider the amount of time the plaintiff spent in
Serbia when determining his last habitual residence. Id. at 245. The
court’s ruling hinged upon the Immigration and Nationalization Act, that
defines “residence” as “the place of general abode . . . without regard to
intent.” Id. (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION: To determine a last habitual residence under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, a court may look to established
residences, as well as permanent and semi-permanent places where one
lived, but should not look to the intent of the refugee status applicant. Id.
Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate
remedy for a violation of Brady v. Maryland.” Id. at 250.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court held in Brady that “suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Id. at 251 n.1 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963)). The 3rd Circuit found instructive United States v. Morrison,
which “expressed a preference for suppression of evidence or retrial as a
more appropriate remedy for a pre-trial constitutional violation.” Id. at
253 (citing 449 U.S. 361 (1981)). The 3rd Circuit noted that no circuits
have upheld a dismissal with prejudice for a Brady violation. Id. at 254
n.6. As a result, the court ruled that dismissal with prejudice might be
appropriate only where there was deliberate misconduct on the part of
the prosecution. Id. at 254-55.
CONCLUSION: Absent deliberate misconduct, dismissal with
prejudice is an inappropriate remedy for a violation of Brady v.
Maryland. Id. at 259.
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FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “a criminal defendant [has] a federal
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel with regard to a
post-conviction, post-direct appeal motion for reduction of sentence
made by the government pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(b).” Id. at 530.
ANALYSIS: The court found that the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee a defendant a right to counsel in this situation. Id. at 535. The
court explained that although the Sixth Amendment provides a right to
counsel on direct appeals to which the defendant is entitled as a matter of
right, such protections do not extend to direct discretionary appeals. Id. at
536. The court reasoned that “because a defendant has no federal
constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on
direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right when the
government makes a motion which can only benefit him by reducing his
already final sentence.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “neither the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantees nor due process guarantees provide criminal
defendants a right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to a
motion by the government pursuant to Rule 35(b).” Id.
United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[Whether] venue on a false claim charge may be
proper in a district into which the victimized government agency had
passed the subject claim after its initial presentation to that agency (either
by the defendant or an intermediary).” Id. at 530.
ANALYSIS: Ebersole, the president and director of a business that
dealt with the federal government, challenged the district court’s holding
that venue was appropriate “in any district into which the victimized
federal agency passed the [false] claim, in the normal course of its
business, following the [false] claim’s initial presentation to that
agency.” Id. at 528. The 4th Circuit, building on its decision in United
States v. Bleeker, 657 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1981), reasoned that false
claims may constitute continuing offenses for the purpose of establishing
venue. Id. at 531. In addition, the court noted that the mere presentation
of a false claim to the government could amount to an offense. See id. at

200

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:175

531. Multiple presentations of false claims could establish venue in many
different districts. Id. at 530. “As nothing in Blecker compels a contrary
conclusion, it is of no significance that the false claims there were
presented directly to the targeted federal agency just once (by the
intermediary), and that Ebersole’s false claims were presented directly to
the agencies multiple times (as they passed the claims internally in the
course of processing them for payment).” Id. at 531.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit concluded that a false claim charge
is proper in a district into which the victimized government agency has
passed the subject claim after its initial presentation to that agency. Id. at
531.
United Sates v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant may . . . waive his right to
attack his conviction and sentence collaterally.” Id. at 220
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit cited, without analysis, to those circuits
which hold that “the right to attack a sentence collaterally may be waived
as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary” and declined “to
distinguish the enforceability of a waiver of direct-appeal rights from a
waiver of collateral-attack rights in [a] plea agreement.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit found that a “criminal defendant
may waive his right to attack his conviction and sentence collaterally, so
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Id.
Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a state law permitting jails to collect a $1.00
per day fee from inmates’ accounts to defray the cost of housing those
inmates is in violation of the “due process liberty right to be free from
punishment before conviction.” Id. at 246.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit began by noting that “[a]lthough
detainees have a right to be free from punishment, clearly ‘not every
inconvenience encountered during pretrial detention amounts to
punishment in the constitutional sense.’” Id. at 250. The court enunciated
a two-part standard by which it could be determined whether an action
by a jail constitutes a punishment. Id. at 251. First, the determination
would need to be made that the fee amounted to a disability. Second, if
such a finding were made, the court would next need to consider whether
the action was taken with the express intent to punish; or, if there was no
such express intent “whether ‘an alternative purpose to which [the act]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it’ and the action does not
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appear ‘excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’” Id. at
251 (citations omitted). The 4th Circuit noted that it did not need to
address the question of whether the fee amounted to a disability because
the second part of the inquiry was not established in this case. Id. at 25151. The court found that the fee demonstrated no express intent to
punish, and was also supported by the legitimate government purpose of
defraying the cost of providing for prisoners. Id. at 252.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that a state law allowing jails to
assess a $1.00 a day fee to pretrial detainees’ accounts is not
unconstitutional as a punishment before conviction Id.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a Louisiana conviction of the inchoate crime
of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute can be
construed as a ‘serious drug offense,’ as defined under § 924(e).3.” Id. at
705.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit turned to its sister courts, which hold
that inchoate crimes may constitute serious drug offenses, even where
they are not specifically listed in the statutory language. Id. at 707. In a
case the 5th Circuit found partially persuasive, United States v, King, the
2nd Circuit court placed importance on the statutory language “involving
serious drug offense[s].” Id. (citing 325 F.3d 110, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003),
(emphasis added)). The King court took an expansive view of the word
‘involving,’ stating that it “‘must be read as including more than merely
the crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and importation themselves.’”
Id. (citing King, 325 F.3d at 113). The 5th Circuit adopted the holding in
King, finding that the inchoate crime of attempted possession with intent
to distribute to qualify as a serious crime under § 924(e). Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that inchoate crimes
qualify as serious drug offenses under § 924(e) since the term
“involving” should be read expansively to include crimes not specifically
listed in the statutory language. Id.
In re Reed, 405 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether § 726(a)(5) entitles a trustee to interest on
his compensation and reimbursement award, and if so, at what point such
interest begins to accrue.” Id. at 340.
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ANALYSIS: Answering this question in the negative, the 5th Circuit
noted it was interpreting the section to conform with Congress’s intent.
Id. at 340. As such, “[d]isallowing trustees to recover under § 726(a)
[did] not leave them without a means to ultimately receive the monies
they are due [because] the fees and expenses sought by trustees in
bankruptcy proceedings are clearly allowed under § 503(b)(2), with
payment authorized by § 503(a).” Id. at 343.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that § 726(a)(5) precluded the
recovery of interest on reimbursement awards. Id.
Praylor v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 423 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires prison
facilities to “provide hormone treatment to transsexual inmates . . . .” Id.
at 525.
ANALYSIS: With little discussion, the 5th Circuit determined that it
“will follow those circuits that have determined transsexualism to be a
serious medical need raising Eighth Amendment considerations.” Id. at
525. Cabining this declaration, the court noted that “while some method
of treatment of inmate transsexuals is required, such inmates do not have
a constitutional right to hormone therapy. Rather, the prison facility must
afford the transsexual inmate some form of treatment based upon the
specific circumstances of each case.” Id. at 525-6.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that transsexualism in prison
inmates may raise Eighth Amendment considerations, but the extent of
treatment required turns on the specific circumstances of the inmate. Id.
White Buffalo Ventures, L.L.C v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366
(5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketings Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM) preempts state
actors’ ability to block spam emails. Id. at 371.
ANALYSIS: White Buffalo sent thousands of unsolicited e-mails to
University of Texas (UT) students. Id. at 369. When the university
blocked them, White Buffalo claimed that CAN-SPAM’s preemption
clause prevented UT from blocking the emails because the university
was a state actor. Id. at 371. The 5th Circuit disagreed, finding there to be
“two competing interpretations” of CAN-SPAM’s preemptive power. Id.
at 372.
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that because there is no
clear interpretation of CAN-SPAM’s preemption clause, the court “must
not infer preemption” and UT can block spam emails. Id. at 372.
Long v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether an alien’s appeal [to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)] is withdrawn under § 3.4 by virtue of the
alien’s ‘involuntary or unknowing departure from the United States.’” Id.
at 518.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit conducted a de novo review of the
BIA’s conclusion that the involuntary departure of the alien from the
United States resulted in the withdrawal of the alien’s appeal under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.4. Id. at 519. The court considered the reasonableness of
the BIA interpretations of the immigration regulations and whether the
factual findings of the BIA were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at
519. The court concluded that the alien’s actions were consistent with 8
C.F.R. § 1003.4 and noted that § 1003.4 on its face, “does not distinguish
between [involuntary and voluntary.]” Id. at 520.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit ultimately found that withdrawal of
appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4, can occur where an alien has
voluntarily or involuntarily departed from the United States. Id.
McClaren v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, 420 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether plaintiff, in light of supporting statements
made in connection with an application for social security disability
benefits, is judicially estopped from making a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Id. at 461.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court addressed this question in
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and held that
although social security disability and Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) claims seem incompatible, the two claims can be reconciled
and applied to a single individual where the individual can sufficiently
explain the inconsistency. Id. at 463. The 5th Circuit agreed with the
Supreme Court’s rationale in Cleveland and applied it to this case. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that where a plaintiff’s
statements on his social security disability application made prior to his
not being selected for the assistant director position contained
descriptions of his pains, injuries, and health conditions, plaintiff was
estopped from claiming age discrimination under the ADA. Id. at 464.
The plaintiff claimed that the company’s decision not to give him the
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assistant director position compelled him to elect to have debilitating
spinal surgery and but for the company’s decision he would have chosen
a less intrusive treatment. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim
was insufficient to explain his statements on his disability application. Id.
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “increased risk allegedly serious enough to
require current medical monitoring qualified as injury in fact, conferring
standing.” Id. at 568.
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed case law from other circuits that
held that a condition, which enhances the risk of future injury and thus
requiring medical monitoring, constitutes injury in fact. Id. at 571-74.
Adopting this position, the court held that if facts are alleged which
“suggest an increased risk of future harm” there is an injury in fact, and,
thus, standing. Id. at 574.
CONCLUSION: An increased risk of serious injury which requires
medical monitoring constitutes an injury in fact. Id.
Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable
in bankruptcy . . . .” Id. at 396.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “11 U.S.C. § 727(b) provides that
a discharge under Chapter 7 relieves a debtor of all debts incurred prior
to the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, except those nineteen categories
of debts specifically enumerated in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). A debt for prepetition legal services is not one of the non-dischargeable debts
enumerated in § 523(a).” Id. The court noted that 11 U.S.C. § 329 would
not be rendered meaningless because pre-petition attorney fees were held
to be dischargeable. Id. at 397. The court reasoned that § 329 does in fact
add to Chapter 7 proceedings. Id. For example, the court noted, § 329
covers post-petition attorney fees. Id.
CONCLUSION: In applying the clear language of the Bankruptcy
Code, the court held that pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable. Id.
at 396.
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Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc, 410 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Issue before the court was how to calculate the amount
in controversy, required for federal jurisdiction, under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301. Id. at 882.
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the 3rd and 7th Circuits for
guidance in this matter. The 7th Circuit has applied a distinct formula to
cases concerning defective vehicles: the cost of a replacement vehicle
minus the present value of the defective vehicle is further reduced by the
value one obtains from his or her use of that vehicle. Id. at 883 (citing
Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Furthermore, because the Act provides that the amount in controversy
does not include interest, a finance contract should not determine federal
jurisdiction. Id. at 883-84.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that “finance
charges of a contract should not be added when determining if the
amount in controversy has been satisfied.” Id. at 885. Thus, the proper
formula is determined by subtracting the present value of a defective
vehicle from the cost of a replacement vehicle. Id.
United States v. Cole, 418 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a state conviction for being a minor in
possession of alcohol is ‘countable’ under § 4A1.2(c) of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (‘the Guidelines’) for purposes of
calculating a federal defendant’s criminal history score.” Id. at 593.
ANALYSIS: Defendant had been convicted of possession with the
intent to distribute the drug Ecstasy and at sentencing, the trial judge
used his convictions as a minor to increase his sentence. Id. at 593-94.
The court discussed the factors taken by other circuits, including the
“multi-factor” approach taken by the 5th Circuit, the “elements”
approach of the 3rd Circuit, the “essential characteristics” approach of
the 10th Circuit, and a blended approach of the 9th Circuit. Id. at 595-97.
In using the 10th Circuit’s “essential characteristics” test, the court
explained that the proper evaluation should be to “consider the similarity
between the “essential characteristics” of the activity underlying the
offense of prior conviction and those underlying the listed offense.” Id. at
598. As a result of this balancing test, the court overturned the
application of defendant’s prior criminal offenses which were committed
when he was a minor. Id. at 600.
CONCLUSION: The “essential characteristics” balancing test is
appropriate to determine if an offense committed when one was a
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juvenile can be used as a sentencing factor under the Guidelines. Id. at
598.
Miltimore Sales, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier, Inc., 412 F.3d 685 (6th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Is a motion for attorney fees under [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 54(d)(2)(B) timely if filed within fourteen days of the
district court’s denial of a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion?” Id. at 687.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit looked to the meaning of the word
“judgment” as used in FRCP 54 to determine when the tolling began and
whether or not a final judgment is required after a dismissal of a FRCP
59(e) motion. Id. at 688. “The disposition of the Rule 59(e) motions is an
order or ruling that reinstates the finality of the original entry of
judgment and a ruling that makes the underlying judgment appealable.”
Id. The court aligned itself with similar holdings from the 2nd and 11th
circuits and attempted to clarify the inefficiency and confusion created
by the federal rule. Id. at 689-691.
CONCLUSION: “We hold that because a timely filed Rule 59(e)
motion destroys the finality of judgment, a motion for attorney fees filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) is timely if filed
within fourteen days of the order disposing of the Rule 59(e) motion.” Id.
at 691.
In re Lott, 139 F. App’x 658 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s “assertion of actual innocence
effect[s] a waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges.” Id.
at 660.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision to
execute a discovery order for attorney-client and work product privilege
material because defendant had asserted himself innocent of murder
during a habeas proceeding. Id. at 659. The district court had determined
as a matter of first impression that defendant’s claim of innocence would
act as an implied waiver to discussions with attorneys and the state
should have access to any statements made by defendant as to his
innocence of guilt. Id. The court reasoned that implied waivers have been
narrowly interpreted and have only applied to attorney privilege where
the conduct of the attorney is questioned. Id. at 660. The court pointed to
the lack of any authority supporting the district court’s finding of an
implied waiver. Id. at 661.
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit found that due to the error in the
district court’s ruling that the defendant “shall not be required to waive
the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege.” Id. at 663.
United States v. Palcios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a state-felony drug conviction, which would
not be a felony under federal law, could nevertheless constitute an
‘aggravated felony’ as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).” Id. at 694.
ANALYSIS: The defendant appealed the district court’s sentence
imposed upon him after he pleaded guilty to “illegally reentering the
United States after having been previously removed.” Id. at 694. The
sentence rendered was enhanced because of the defendant’s two prior
drug convictions. Id. The defendant based his appeal on two issues. The
first, and most important, issue raised by the defendant is that the district
court committed a reversible error by concluding that his sentence should
be enhanced because of his prior state-law felony convictions, which the
court considered to be “aggravated felonies.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed
with the defendant in that the previous two drug convictions were not
“aggravated felonies.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the defendant’s two prior
cocaine convictions did not constitute “aggravated felonies” and did not
authorize the sentencing enhancement found in the Immigration &
Nationality Act. Id. at 694.
United States v. Bernal-Aveja, 414 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a burglary of a dwelling charge in an
indictment is sufficient to prove, without more, that a guilty plea to a
lesser included burglary offense constitutes ‘a crime of violence’ under
the [United States Sentencing] Guidelines.” Id. at 627.
ANALYSIS: The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the
United States and was sentenced by the district court to fifty-seven
months in prison. Id. at 626. The district court ruled that the defendant’s
prior conviction for burglary was a “crime of violence” and enhanced the
defendant’s sentence. Id. The defendant appealed the district court’s
decision that the prior burglary conviction was a “crime of violence.” Id.
The 6th Circuit stated that “‘a crime of violence’ includes ‘burglary
of a dwelling’” and that the government holds the burden of proof in
demonstrating that the defendant’s previous conviction was a “crime of
violence.” Id. Since the defendant’s prior guilty plea did not specify what
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type of structure was burglarized, the court cannot presume that the
defendant committed “burglary of a dwelling.” Id. at 627-628.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the burglary of a dwelling
charge “was insufficient” in proving that the defendant’s guilty plea to a
“lesser included burglary offense” constituted a crime of violence that
justified the use of the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 628.
Lukowski v. CSX Transp., Inc., 416 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a plaintiff who is within the ‘zone of danger’
may recover damages under FELA [Federal Employer’s Liability Act]
for emotional distress suffered not as a result of fear for personal
physical safety, but rather, as a result of witnessing a third party’s peril.”
Id. at 482.
ANALYSIS: The court’s analysis began by stating that “in order to
recover emotional distress damages under FELA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he or she was within the ‘zone of danger’ of physical
impact.” Id. FELA “refers simply to ‘injury,’ which may encompass both
physical and emotional injury.” Id. Therefore, the court decided that “the
common law ‘zone of danger’ test limits recovery for emotional injury to
those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s
negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm
by that conduct.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit ruled that the phrase “emotional
injury caused by physical injury to himself” limits the recovery for
emotional distress to “damages suffered as a result of a fear for one’s
own physical safety.” Id. at 483. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s
emotional distress injuries that did not arise out of fear for his own
personal safety were not recoverable damages under FELA. Id. at 478.
United States v. Hargrove, 416 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a “defendant’s prior convictions for violating
[the] Ohio statute criminalizing sexual conduct with [a] stepchild”
qualify as “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924. Id. at 486.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that ACCA defines violent felonies as
including crimes that “have as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or another or crimes
that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” Id. at 494. The 6th Circuit then used a “categorical
approach,” which was “limited to an examination of the fact of
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conviction and the statutory definition of the predicate offense.” Id. This
result forces the “trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior offense.” Id. Here, the Ohio statute in
question “does not distinguish between consensual sex and forced sex, or
between sex with a minor and sex with an adult.” Id. at 496. Since the
Ohio statute and the defendant’s indictment failed to make this
distinction, this situation “does not present a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The defendant’s prior felony convictions under the
“Ohio statute criminalizing sexual conduct with [a] stepchild” do not
constitute violent felonies under the ACCA. Id. Therefore, the sentence
should not have been enhanced.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Odometer Act [49 U.S.C. § 32701
et.seq.] creates a private right of action based on a violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 580.5(c) where the transferor’s fraudulent intent is unrelated to a
vehicle’s odometer or mileage.” Id. at 710.
ANALYSIS: The plaintiff proposed a broad interpretation of the
statute so that “a plaintiff has a private right of action under § 32710 if
there has been a violation of the Odometer Act or any of its
implementing regulations and the violator intended to defraud the
plaintiff.” Id. at 711. The 7th Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim and
looked to the plain meaning of the statute and Congress’s intent in
drafting the statute. The court concluded that “the private right of action
covers prohibited acts that are committed with fraudulent intent and
excludes cases where some fraudulent act happens to coincide with a
violation of a regulation but the violative act is done for reasons other
than to perpetrate a fraud.” Id. at 712.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “[t]he Odometer Act
creates a private right of action for violations of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c)
only where a transferor chose not to disclose a vehicle’s mileage to the
transferee in writing on the title with intent to defraud as to the vehicle’s
mileage.” Id. at 715.
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Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
should be applied retroactively. Id. at 865.
ANALYSIS: “As a general matter, we look at the Supreme Court’s
holdings as of the time of the relevant state court decision to determine
clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court prohibits analyzing
the reasonableness of a state court determination in light of a ‘new’
Supreme Court rule propounded after the state court made its decision.”
Id. at 865. Therefore, the court analyzed whether Crawford announced a
new rule. Id. In discussing the issue the court stated, “[i]t seems clear that
Crawford was a clean break from the line of precedent established by
Roberts. Crawford considered and rejected the continuing application of
Roberts. Nevertheless, a state court would not have acted unreasonably
by failing to anticipate this ruling and applying Roberts. Crawford was
thus a new rule for purposes of Teague.” Id. at 866-67. Lastly, the court
noted that neither of the two exceptions to the Teague rule applied to the
present case. Id. at 867.
CONCLUSION: “Crawford, therefore, is not a watershed change for
purposes of the second Teague exception and does not apply
retroactively.” Id. 867.
McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether people who wanted information under 18
U.S.C.S. § 2721(b) had a private right of action. Id. at 702.
ANALYSIS: “The statute authorizes private suits, but only by
persons whose information has been disclosed improperly. § 2724(a).”
Id. at 703. The court noted that 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 “provides a remedy
only for the violation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws’ of the United States. ‘Rights’ differ from ‘broader
or vaguer benefits or interests’ that some statutes create.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “Because McCready is no different from any other
member of the public, so far as § 2721(b) is concerned, he can’t use §
1983 to supply the private right of action missing from § 2724(a).” Id. at
703-04.
United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether substances which are “not officially scheduled
as controlled substances themselves [under the Controlled Substances
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Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802] may be regulated as such if they meet the
definition of a ‘controlled substance analogue.’” Id. at 521.
ANALYSIS: This was an issue of statutory construction, revolving
on the placement of the word “or” between the second and third clauses
of the statute. Id. Because the court found there to be a lack of clarity in
the statute, it looked to several other circuits who had interpreted the
conjunctive reading. This interpretation was based “largely on the
absurd results that might obtain under a disjunctive reading, noting that
alcohol and caffeine could be criminalized as controlled substance
analogues based solely on the fact that, in concentrated form, they might
have depressant or stimulant effects similar to illegal drugs.” Id. at 52223. Additionally, the legislative history shows that “the Act was intended
primarily to prevent scientists from slightly modifying the chemical
structure of banned drugs to create new ‘designer drugs’ that would have
similar physiological effects but would not be covered by the law’s
controlled substances schedules.” Id. at 523.
CONCLUSION: The other circuits’ common-sense based, practical
interpretation leads to the ultimate conclusion that the conjunctive
reading is appropriate. Id.
United States v. Deutsch, 403 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a district court may impose consecutive
prison terms upon revoking concurrent terms of supervised release.” Id.
at 916.
ANALYSIS: Other circuits, including the 8th Circuit, have clearly
rejected the argument that a district court can impose a sentence of no
longer than five years following a revocation of supervised release. Id. at
917. Title 18, section 3624(e) of the U.S. Code relied on by the prisoner
in this appeal, “simply explains when a term of supervised release begins
to run and clarifies that it runs concurrently with other terms of
supervised release or parole.” Id. 917. Finally, the statutory guidelines
“limit only the length of each term, not the length of overall punishment;
therefore, when each individual term is lawful – as here – it may be
stacked consecutively with other lawfully imposed terms.” Id.
CONCLUSION: A district court can exercise its own “discretion to
impose consecutive prison terms upon revoking concurrent terms of
supervised release.” Id. at 918.
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In re UAL Corp., 408 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the term “‘interested party,’ as used in the
section of the Bankruptcy Code governing rejection of [collective
bargaining agreements] CBAs,” should it be interpreted as synonymous
with “party in interest” Id.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit first stated that “[a]lthough the
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term ‘interested party,’ . . . it is
most naturally read to mean ‘party to the collective bargaining
agreement’ or a guarantor of the contract.” Id. at 851. The court then
stated that if the term ‘interested party’ were treated as a synonym of
‘party in interest,’ then it would include “any person with a financial
stake in the employer’s performance of the collective bargaining
agreement.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that “interested party” was not
synonymous with “party in interest” and that an “interested party” in this
instance was a party to the agreement or a guarantor of that agreement.
Id. The court’s rationale was based on a fear that to do otherwise would
run the risk of making such proceedings unmanageable. Id.
United States v. Von Loh, 417 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether separate instances of rape that involve the
same victim can be considered separate counts for sentencing purposes.
Id. at 712-13.
ANALYSIS: On multiple occasions, defendant statutorily raped a
fourteen-year-old girl he met online. Id. at 712. He was convicted based
on one encounter but had admitted to others; the district court chose not
to group the offenses in sentencing him. Id. Defendant argued that all the
encounters occurred in one “relationship” and involved substantially the
same harm, and thus should be considered one count. Id. The 7th Circuit
disagreed and held, consistent with other circuits, that “counts should be
grouped [only] when they involve substantially the same harm and when
‘one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense
characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to
another of the counts.” Id. at 714. Since the defendant’s conduct did not
fit into that category, his counts were separable. Id.
CONCLUSION: Repetition of conduct in multiple acts of one crime
does not constitute one count of that crime. Id. at 714.

2005]

First Impressions

213

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a trial
by jury is violated under Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New
Jersey, because the amount of restitution ordered was “beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum [and thus] must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 903.
ANALYSIS: Defendant was convicted of fraud in a counterfeit
scheme and sentenced to pay restitution under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Id. at 902. Under the MVRA, restitution
claims were provable by a preponderance of the evidence, unlike
criminal prosecutions subject to a reasonable doubt standard. Id. The
court noted that all other circuits deciding this issue had held that
restitution orders were not affected by Blakely and Apprendi, and did not
“prohibit judicial fact finding for restitution orders.” Id. at 904. Because
the MVRA did not provide any maximum limits for restitution, and
because Blakely “dealt with determinate sentencing rather than a
restitution statute without a set maximum limit,” the court found no
constitutional objection to MVRA. Id.
CONCLUSION: The MVRA restitution orders, given by a judge and
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, are not in violation of
Apprendi v. New Jersey or Blakely v. Washington, which require any fact
that increases penalty for a crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum
to be submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972 (8th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993] imposes strict liability for all interferences with FMLA rights,
or whether the FMLA condones lawful interference with FMLA rights.”
Id. at 977.
ANALYSIS: When an employee properly makes use of her FMLA
benefits, specifically leave time, she “does not have unlimited restoration
rights upon returning from leave.” Id. at 978. Essentially, what the
FMLA does provide is “leave with an expectation an employee will
return to work after the leave ends.” Id. Furthermore, “if an employer
were authorized to discharge an employee if the employee were not on
FMLA leave, the FMLA does not shield an employee on FMLA leave
from the same, lawful discharge.” Id. This notion comports with the plain

214

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:175

language and structure of the statute, the Department of Labor’s
understanding of the FMLA, as well as the 10th Circuit. Id. at 978-79.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “an employer who interferes
with an employee’s FMLA rights will not be liable if the employer can
prove it would have made the same decision had the employee not
exercised the employee’s FMLA rights” Id. at 977.
United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the doctrine of equitable tolling is available
to … a [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 movant.” Id. at 1092.
ANALYSIS: Provided in occurs within the one-year statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows for a motion to be brought to
“vacate, set aside, or correct [a] sentence.” Id. at 1090. The 8th Circuit
cited with approval a 9th Circuit decision, United States v. Battles, 362
F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), which compared the motion brought pursuant
to § 2255 with a habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Martin, 408 F.3d at 1092. The 9th Circuit stated that both statutes “have
the same operative language and the same purpose.” Id. (citing Battles,
262 F.3d at 1196). Therefore, the 9th Circuit failed to see any reason “to
distinguish between them in this regard.” Id. at 1092 (citing U.S. v.
Battles, 262 F.3d at 1196). The 8th Circuit, following the 9th Circuit’s
rationale joined the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding
that equitable tolling applies to § 2255. Id.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the 8th Circuit found that the doctrine of
equitable tolling applies to a § 2255 movant. Id. at 1092.
United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the use of [a defendant’s] post-arrest, preMiranda silence during the government’s case-in-chief [is]
constitutional.” Id. at 1109.
ANALYSIS: Although the 8th Circuit noted that in various other
situations use of a defendant’s silence as a sign of guilt violates the
defendant’s rights, the court found that use of a defendant’s silence postarrest, pre-Miranda does not violate any of the defendant’s rights. Id. at
1110. The Court found that the main issue is whether the defendant was
“under [an] ‘official compulsion to speak.’” Id. If the defendant was
under such a compulsion, then the silence is inadmissible; however, if
there was not official compulsion to speak, then it can be used. Id. The
8th Circuit then found that arrest alone does not constitute “official
compulsion to speak.” Id. at 1111.
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CONCLUSION: Use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence during the government’s case-in-chief is constitutional as long as
the defendant was not under an “official compulsion to speak,” which
arrest alone does not constitute.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Park Med. Cent., Inc., 413 F.3d 897
(8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether Erika’s civil enforcement provision
completely preempts the civil penalties provision of the Arkansas
[Patient Protection Act] PPA, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-99-207.” Id. at 907.
ANALYSIS: Analyzing this question under the recent Supreme
Court decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), the
court looked to the legislative scheme behind ERISA as well as the
Arkansas PPA statute to decide whether the PPA statute conflicted the
exclusive ERISA remedy. Id. at 914. The PPA civil penalty provision
allowed participants to bring suit where their plan denied reimbursement
for services from a provider. Id. This provision was expressly preempted
by ERISA where the federal statute provided for a similar remedy. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that “ERISA completely
preempts the civil penalties provision of the Arkansas PPA as applied to
suits that could have been brought under ERISA § 502.” Id. at 908.
NINTH CIRCUIT
Bailey v. County of Riverside, 414 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the [14 day] Rule 54(d)(2)(B) time limit is
tolled pending the outcome of post-trial motions under Rule 50 or Rule
59.” Id. at 1025.
ANALYSIS: “The other circuits to reach this question have held that
the requirement that the motion for attorneys’ fees ‘must be filed no later
than 14 days after entry of judgment’ is tolled pending the outcome of
post-trial motions under Rule 50 or Rule 59.” Id. (citations omitted).
“[T]hose motions operate to suspend the finality of the district court’s
judgment.” Id. “A ‘judgment’ for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure includes a decree or order ‘from which an appeal lies.’” Id.
(citations omitted). “The judgment was not appealable during the
pendency of the post trial motions in this case.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: The court concluded held that “[t]he Rule
54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees is timely if filed no later than 14 days after
the resolution of a Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b), or Rule 59 motion.” Id.
Lisbey v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a conviction of an alien for sexual battery in
California constitutes an aggravated felony rendering that alien
removable from the country under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id. at 93031.
ANALYSIS: Lisbey pled guilty to sexual battery in California, which
proscribes the use of physical force to perform an act for sexual
gratification, arousal or abuse. Id. at 931 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §
243.4(a)). Under the INA, an alien is deportable if convicted of an
aggravated felony, which includes a “crime of violence” in its definition
Id. To be considered a crime of violence, the crime must include a
“‘substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.’” Id. at
932. Decisions by the Supreme Court, as well as other circuits, held that
sexual crimes were crimes of violence. Id. at 932-33 (citing Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 276
(9th Cir. 1995); Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2004);
Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2000); United States
v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993).
CONCLUSION: A conviction for sexual battery in California
constitutes an aggravated felony, rendering an alien convicted of that
crime removable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Hawthorne Sav. F.S.B. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 421 F.3d 835 (9th
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1011 et seq. “bars the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, from
preempting or otherwise interfering with Pennsylvania’s rehabilitation
and liquidation statutes.” Id. at 842.
ANALYSIS: The McCarran-Ferguson Act “provides that ‘[n]o Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.’” Id. The defendant
argued that federal jurisdiction impaired “the operation of Pennsylvania’s
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state-law liquidation regime.” Id. The court disagreed and, relying on
Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2000), held that § 1332 did
not dispossess Pennsylvania of jurisdiction over the liquidation and
disposition of assets. Hawthorne, 421 F.3d at 842.
CONCLUSION: 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is not pre-empted by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 844.
United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the admission of a “certificate of nonexistence
of record” (“CNR”) violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause rights in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004). Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828.
ANALYSIS: Under Crawford, non-testimonial evidence is not
subject to the Confrontation Clause, and common law exceptions to
hearsay typically encompass non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 832. The
district court had approved the use of the CNR under the business
records exception to hearsay. Id. at 833. The court, finding that records
are regularly kept by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, found
that those records constitute business records. Thus, an affidavit
concerning those records properly fell within the scope of the business
records exemption, making the CNR non-testimonial evidence which is
not barred by Crawford. Id. at 833-34.
CONCLUSION: The admission of a CNR, in which an Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”) stated there was no evidence in INS
records that alien had received permission for admission into the United
States, does not violate an alien’s Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 828.
United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: What is the meaning of the phrase “altered or
obliterated” as used in United States Sentencing Guidelines §
2K2.1(b)(4)? Id. at 910.
ANALYSIS: Noting that no court has ruled on the question, the 9th
Cir. looked at the plain language of the statute. Id. at 911. The court
rejected the requirement put forth by the defendant that the serial number
of a gun must be untraceable by microscopy. Id. Because “altered or
obliterated” is phrased in the disjunctive, and because the word “altered”
can be defined as “to change or make different,” a change which makes
the serial number unobservable to the naked eye suffices for U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(4). Id. at 912-13. The court found that neither the structural
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context nor the legislative history dictated an alternative result. Id. at
913-14.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “for the purposes of Guideline §
2K2.1(b)(4), a firearm’s serial number is ‘altered or obliterated’ when it
is materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less
accessible.” Id. at 910. The court further held that, “under that standard, a
serial number which is not discernable to the unaided eye, but which
remains detectable via microscopy, is altered or obliterated.” Id.
United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether, for [FED. R. CRIM. P.] 41 purposes, a
deputation as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal confers ‘federal law
enforcement officer’ status on a state law enforcement official.” Id. at
1070.
ANALYSIS: “Statutes and regulations give the Marshals authority to
deputize local law enforcement officials to ‘perform the functions of
Deputy U.S. Marshals’” Id. U.S. Marshals have long had the authority to
“seek and execute federal search warrants.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that a “state law enforcement
officer’s deputation as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal made him a
“federal law enforcement officer,” for purposes of [FED. R. CRIM. P. 41]
governing who may request federal search warrants.” Id.
Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: In a civil rights case, what is “the appropriate test of
benchmarking [a] hybrid right,” one which “involves both speech and
associational rights under the First Amendment?” Id. at 693.
ANALYSIS: Here, the court looked to what other circuits have done
in similar hybrid cases. Id. at 696-98. First, the court noted the 2nd
Circuit applied the Pickering test to a case where a teacher was
terminated when it was discovered that he belonged to a certain
association. Id. at 696. Second, the court stated that both the 7th and 11th
Circuits have reasoned that the Pickering/Connick analysis “does not
adequately protect associational claims.” Id. 697-98. Therefore, the court
stated “[b]earing in mind the Supreme Court’s seminal public employee
speech cases and their application in cases from the other circuits, we
conclude that Pickering should be applied in this hybrid rights case. The
speech and associational rights at issue here are so intertwined that we
see no reason to distinguish this hybrid circumstance from a case
involving only speech rights.” Id. at 698.
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CONCLUSION: “We conclude that this case should be evaluated
under the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), and that under Pickering, the college’s
legitimate safety and pedagogical concerns outweighed the instructor’s
rights.” Id. 693.
Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the 9th Circuit “[m]ay . . . review the decision
of a district court outside [its] circuit to transfer a case into [its] circuit”
Id. at 978.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first rejected petitioner’s contention that
precedent suggested that such review was permissible, as neither case
“actually dealt with a ‘transferor court . . . not within [the 9th] circuit . . .
.” Id. at 979. The court then discussed the position adopted by seven of
its sister circuits, who “have all held that a transferee circuit does not
have jurisdiction to review a transfer court order by a transferor in
another circuit.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit ultimately joined its sister circuits,
holding that a 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer is not subject to review “by a
district court outside of [its] circuit to a district court within [its] circuit.”
Id. at 980.
In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, and to what extent, a bankruptcy courtappointed trustee of a liquidating trust may be sued in a foreign
jurisdiction without permission of the court appointing the trustee.” Id. at
970.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first turned to the Barton doctrine,
“established by the Supreme Court over a century ago, which provides
that, before suit can be brought against a court-appointed receiver, ‘leave
of the court by which he was appointed must be obtained.’” Id. at 970-71
(citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881)). The court found
the doctrine to apply in bankruptcy because “‘[t]he trustee in bankruptcy
is a statutory successor to the equity receiver,’ and ‘[j]ust like the equity
receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in effect for the court that
appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under
the court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.’” Id. at 971.
Joining its sister circuits, the court held that “a party must first obtain
leave of the bankruptcy court before it initiates an action in another
forum against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer appointed by the

220

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:175

bankruptcy court for acts done in the officer’s official capacity.” Id. at
970.
CONCLUSION: “The requirement of uniform application of
bankruptcy law dictates that all legal proceedings that affect the
administration of the bankruptcy estate be brought either in bankruptcy
court or with leave of the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 971.
Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an American citizen’s guarantees of
payments that furthered a trade agreement with an Iranian company are
covered by . . . Executive Order [13,059 § 2(d)] and, if so, whether the
guarantees are unenforceable as a result.” Id. at 930.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit interpreted the Executive Order as it
would a statute; therefore, the analysis commenced with an examination
of the text. After applying the express language of the Executive Order to
the facts presented, the court reviewed the district court’s holding that
such guarantee agreements could facilitate trade between Iran and Hong
Kong by a U.S. citizen.
CONCLUSION: The court held “that the guarantees were illegal
under the Executive Order and, under the circumstances of this case,
unenforceable.” Id. at 930.
Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[Whether] the favorable termination rule of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), appl[ies] to civil commitments under
California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act [SVPA]” Id. at 1137.
ANALYSIS: The court first determined whether Heck’s reference to
“prisoners” only applied to convicted criminals. “Heck’s favorable
termination rule was intended to prevent a person in custody from using
[42 U.S.C. § 1983] to circumvent the more stringent requirements for
habeas corpus.” Id. at 1139. Since detainees under statutes such as SVPA
may use a habeas petition to challenge the terms of their confinement,
the court reasoned that Heck must apply to those SVPA detainees with
access to habeas relief.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit, affirming the district court’s
dismissal, “conclude[d] that the Heck rule applies” to such commitments.
Id. at 1137.
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Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 416 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Does [the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s] adverse action
notice requirement apply to the rate first charged in an initial policy of
insurance?” Id. at 1100.
ANALYSIS: Congress mandated that once consumers possess their
credit reports, they will be able to make corrections to and check for any
errors. Id. at 1107. The court noted that “[t]his increases the chances that
a consumer’s financial stability will not be hampered by faulty credit
information.” Id. at 1107-08. The 9th Circuit also found that informing
individuals of bad credit scores can serve to help them learn of the
benefits of higher credit ratings and how to accomplish those ends. Id. at
1108. The court stressed that initial insurance policies, policies that
economically unsophisticated individuals are likely to purchase, must be
protected otherwise the Act would be of little consequence. Id.
CONCLUSION: “The Act requires that an insurance company send
the consumer an adverse action notice whenever a higher rate is charged
because of credit information it obtains, regardless of whether the rate is
contained in an initial policy or an extension or renewal of a policy and
regardless of whether the company has previously charged the consumer
a lower rate.” Id. at 1100. [see also 2005 WL 2714503]
United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “the retroactivity principles of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause preclude the retroactive application of
the remedial holding of United States v. Booker, which excised portions
of Title 18 of the United States Code in order to make the Sentencing
Guidelines effectively advisory.” Id. at 918.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “in Booker, the Supreme
Court expressly stated that both holdings should be applied to cases on
direct review.” Id. at 920. “And our decision in Ameline, under which
Sixth Amendment violations can be cured by giving district courts the
opportunity to resentence defendants under the now-advisory Guidelines,
necessarily implies that appellate courts should apply both Booker
holdings retroactively.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument and
held that he may be resentenced according to the principles set forth in
Booker and Ameline.” Id. at 918.
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Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “May a private, nonsectarian, commercially operated
school, which receives no federal funds, purposefully exclude a student
qualified for admission solely because he is not of pure or part aboriginal
blood?” Id. at 1027.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a private school’s admissions
preference cannot be exclusively racial, yet simultaneously subject to the
special relationship doctrine. The Court’s decision in [Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)] took pains to emphasize the nonracial
nature of the challenged hiring preference, expressly ruling that the
precise classification at issue, which was based on Indian tribal
affiliation, was not racial, but, rather, political in nature; for this reason,
it was subject only to rational basis review.” Id. at 1047. “The same
principle does not apply to the classification employed by the
Kamehameha Schools, which Appellees concede to be exclusively racial
in nature, design and purpose.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “[W]e agree with Doe and find that the Schools’
admissions policy, which operates in practice as an absolute bar to
admission for those of the non-preferred race, constitutes unlawful race
discrimination in violation of § 1981.” Id. at 1027.
Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether federal law may preempt contrary state law as
applied to operating subsidiaries of national banks.
ANALYSIS: The court looked into whether California’s regulations
allowing national banks to create and operate subsidiaries was consistent
with the federal Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A § 21 et seq. Id. at 958. Secondly,
the court considered if California was even allowed to regulate such
entities. Id. The court noted that all of the other circuit and district courts
had determined that federal law trumped state law. Id. n.10. As given in
the Bank Act, the court found “that a state law is preempted as applied to
an operating subsidiary only if it would be preempted as applied to a
national bank.” Id. at 962. “Operating subsidiaries are subject to no less
and no more governmental regulation, state and federal, than national
banks.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Under the Bank Act, agencies may promulgate
regulations providing for the preemption of state banking law in order to
regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks. Id. at 954.
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Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether an abstention from the Younger doctrine
trumps the intervention of right doctrine expressed in Rule 24(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1112.
ANALYSIS: The Younger doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine, and
while it “neither provides a basis for nor destroys federal jurisdiction,
Younger does determine when the federal courts must ‘refrain from
exercising jurisdiction.’” Id. at 1113. On the other hand, Rule 24 is a
more discretionary procedural doctrine. Id. Furthermore, intervention of
right does not alter federal jurisdiction. Id. Finally, “[b]ecause Rule 24
cannot extend federal jurisdiction and Younger abstention imposes
mandatory limits on the federal courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction,
[the court held] that intervention as of right cannot be used to circumvent
Younger abstention.” Id.
CONCLUSION: A district court is “not required to consider the
merits of intervention before disposing of [an] action under Younger.” Id.
at 1114.
Gonzales v. Free Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a group bringing an overbreadth challenge to
the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”) was entitled to receive
attorney’s fees against the government due to the fact that the
“government was not substantially justified in defending the CPPA
because ‘the constitutional flaw in the CPPA was recognizable from the
start.’” Id. at 617-18.
ANALYSIS: Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a
party prevailing against the government is entitled to attorney’s fees
unless the government demonstrates “‘that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.’” Id. at 618. Substantial justification means that the dispute
at issue is something over which reasonable minds could differ. Id. The
views of other courts are significant to answering the question of whether
reasonable minds could differ, and so is a demonstrated string of losses
or successes by the government in arguing its position. Id. In this case
the 9th Circuit found there was substantial disagreement among the
courts of that circuit as well as disagreement among the circuits as to
whether the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit found such disagreement to be
indicative of the fact that reasonable minds could differ over the merit of
the government’s position, and that the government was therefore
justified in defending itself. Id. at 619-20. This being the case, a party
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prevailing against the government in a challenge to the CPPA would not
be entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA.
Guzman-Andrade v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[D]o aliens denied temporary or permanent resident
status by the INS under the [8 U.S.C. § 1255a] legalization program
retain the right to judicial review of the denial after the 1996
amendments to IRCA (the Immigration Reform and Control Act) by
section 308(g)(2)(B) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)?” Id. at 1075.
REFERENTIAL NOTE: (**Please be aware that, at present, the
Legalization Appeals Unit (LAU) is now referred to as the
Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU), and that the INS has been collapsed
into the Department of Homeland Security. Due to the fact that the
procedural history of this case implicates the LAU and the INS prior to
the dates when such changes were made, they are referred to in their
earlier form**). Id.
ANALYSIS: IIRIRA preserves judicial review of a § 1255a denial if
the denial is in reference to a deportation proceeding but not if it is in
reference to an exclusion proceeding. Id. at 1077. Because of the
temporary resident status of the plaintiff in this case, the 9th Circuit
concluded that there was no question that plaintiff “was lawfully within
the United States at the time he filed his legalization application, and
would therefore have been subject to deportation, rather than exclusion,
proceedings prior to IIRIRA.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that it had “jurisdiction under §
1255a(f)(4)(A) to review [plaintiff’s] legalization application.” Id.
Jack Russell Terrier Network v. Am. Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027 (9th
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “a national breed club and registry and several
of its regional affiliates [are] capable of conspiring as separate entities
under §1 of the Sherman Act” Id. at 1034.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that the crucial question in such a
case “is whether the entities alleged to have conspired maintain an
‘economic unity,’ and whether the entities were either actual or potential
competitors.” Id. The court first noted that the “objectives of the [club]
and its regional affiliates are ‘common, not disparate.’” Id. at 1035. The
court then went on to say that “the regional affiliates’ sole purpose are to
be affiliated with the national club and to promote the [club’s] breed
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standard and philosophy. In no way do the affiliates compete with the
club.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Based on the fact that the club and its affiliates were
not separate entities and were not in economic competition, the court
ruled that they could not have entered into a conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 1034-35.
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)
requirement of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), applies to coram
nobis proceedings.” Id. at 1009.
ANALYSIS: “‘[T]he writ [of coram nobis] provides a remedy for
those suffering from the lingering collateral consequences of an
unconstitutional or unlawful conviction based on errors of fact and
egregious legal errors.’” Id. at 1009-10. Under § 2253(c)(1), “the grant of
a COA [is] necessary in only two kinds of appeals: an appeal from ‘(A)
the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or (B) the
final order in a proceeding under section 2255.’” Id. at 1010. The COA
requirement serves a gate keeping function for the courts, but the 9th
Circuit has noted that such functions are not necessary in “legitimate
coram nobis cases . . . [because] few defendants who have already
completely served their sentences continue to have reasons to challenge
their conviction or sentence.” Id. at 1011.
CONCLUSION: Because coram nobis cases are not within the
language of § 2255, and because they do not affect the gate keeping
function of the AEDPA, the COA requirement is inapplicable. Id.
United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the sentencing enhancement for being in
the business of receiving and selling stolen property can apply to a
defendant who sells only property that he himself has obtained by fraud.”
Id. at 1150.
ANALYSIS: “The [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines permit a twolevel enhancement ‘[i]f the offense involved receiving stolen property,
and the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling
stolen property.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4)). “However,
nearly every circuit that has addressed the meaning of this enhancement
has agreed ‘that a thief who sells goods that he himself has stolen is not
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in the business of receiving and selling stolen property.’” Id. The 9th
Circuit agreed with this reading of the enhancement provision, finding
that it was meant to apply to fences (those who are in the business of
receiving stolen merchandise from thieves) and not to the thieves
themselves. Id. at 1153-54.
CONCLUSION: Due to the fact that the defendant in this case was
himself stealing the goods in question and not merely acting as a fence,
the 9th Circuit found that the sentencing enhancement was inapplicable.
Id.
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411
F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the prerequisites set forth in Brook Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. [509 U.S. 209 (1993)] for
establishing liability in sell-side predatory pricing cases apply in cases
where a defendant engages in buy-side predatory bidding by raising the
cost of inputs.” Id. at 1035.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began its analysis of the issue by
explaining that Brook Group places a high burden on the plaintiff in a
case alleging sell-side predatory pricing. Id. at 1036. The plaintiff must
prove that “its competitor operated at a loss and was likely to recoup its
losses.” Id. The 9th Circuit explained that the high burden of proof in
sell-side predatory pricing is necessary because the lower prices that
occur as a result of sell-side predatory pricing are a benefit to the
consumer and often foster competition. Id. at 1037. The 9th Circuit then
explained that there are no real short or long term benefits to consumers
in buy-side predatory pricing, therefore, it is not necessary to have such a
high burden of proof in buy-side cases. Id. at 1037-38.
CONCLUSION: The prerequisites set forth in Brook Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. for establishing liability in sell-side
predatory pricing cases do not apply in cases where a defendant engages
in buy-side predatory bidding by raising the cost of inputs because the
consumer will likely not benefit from the effects of buy-side predatory
bidding. Id. at 1038. Therefore, the high burden of proof in Brook Group
is not needed. Id.
Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “a child of a parent who was forcibly
sterilized is automatically eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(B).” Id. at 1242.
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ANALYSIS: In deciding this issue the court looked to a strict reading
of the statute, which “does not plainly indicate that such children are
deemed eligible.” Id. at 1245. The 9th Circuit explained that when the
language is ambiguous the court should defer to the reasonable
conclusion of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. The court
then evaluates the BIA’s conclusions that automatic eligibility does not
apply to children of sterilized parents because these children are not
necessarily persecuted as a result of the sterilization. Id. Unlike the
spouse of a sterilized person, who is directly effected by the sterilization
by not being able to have children with their spouse, the court finds that
it is not unreasonable to conclude that children of a sterilized parent are
not necessarily automatically persecuted as a result of the sterilization.
Id.
CONCLUSION: A child of a parent who was forcibly sterilized is not
automatically eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
However, the child is still able to bring a claim to show in their particular
circumstances that they should be eligible for asylum. Id.
United States v. Camacho, 413 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the double jeopardy analysis applies where a
defendant has been previously disciplined through sanctions available to
federal employer. Id.
ANALYSIS: In this case, the government employer imposed
sanctions upon the defendant for theft that the court reasoned were
similar to sanctions that a private employer would impose. Id. at 989.
The 9th Circuit stated that “[o]nly when disciplinary sanctions imposed
by the government acting in its role as sovereign are the functional
equivalent of criminal punishment is the double jeopardy bar
implicated.” Id. at 989 n.9. The court recognized the policy reasons
behind barring use of the double jeopardy clause when the government is
the employer and recognized the problems inherent in the government’s
dual nature. Id. at 990.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit fell in line with the 2nd, 5th, 6th,
7th, and 11th Circuits in holding that “criminal prosecution for theft
…does not violate his Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy. The discipline… is the type of discipline any private employer
might have imposed on an employee. It did not rely on the government’s
sovereign power and is thus outside the scope of double jeopardy
concerns.” Id. at 991.
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United States v. Pulliam, 405 F.3d 782 (9th. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a defendant may successfully move to
suppress evidence found in a car in which he was a passenger where the
car and its occupants were legally stopped but unlawfully detained.” Id.
at 792.
ANALYSIS: First, the court looked to vehicular stop caselaw as a
framework. Id. These cases held that a defendant who is not a bona fide
owner of a vehicle may nonetheless contest the legality of his own
incarceration and move to suppress evidence that was found in the
automobile as the “fruit” of his incarceration. Id. The court noted that,
but for the officer’s illegal detaining of the vehicle and passengers, the
officers would not have found the evidence. Id. Therefore, the motion to
suppress was correctly granted. Id. The court clarified that the stop of a
vehicle and detention of the passengers can not be considered separate
and independent events, but rather, the situation must be looked at as a
whole in a “fruits” analysis. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, a legal
stop followed by an illegal incarceration must be considered a single,
integrated instance and treated identically to an illegal stop in which a
defendant can move to suppress the evidence. Id. at 793-94. The court
also held, for purposes of standing to suppress, that passengers and
drivers are considered the same as the owner of the vehicle and all have
standing to move to suppress evidence. Id. at 795. Finally, the court
emphasized the Supreme Court’s stance that “the way to ensure
protections [against unconstitutional police activity] is to exclude
evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high
social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their
crimes.” Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that a passenger of an
automobile who is not the owner may successfully move to suppress
evidence found in a car where the car and its occupants were legally
stopped but unlawfully detained. Id.
Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, is a grant of authority to the federal courts to
invalidate certain state court child custody proceedings that counteracts
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 1044.
ANALYSIS: This case involved a conflict between the State of
California’s right to terminate parental rights over Indian children and
the ICWA, which “ensures the [Indian] tribes a role in adjudicating child
custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled or residing on
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the [Indian] reservation.” Id. at 1039. However, ICWA is limited “where
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” Id.
First, the 9th Circuit determined that this matter fell “within the
traditional boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman” doctrine. Id. at 1043. The
Rocker-Feldman doctrine states that “a federal district court is without
subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state
court.” Id. at 1041. However, the court pointed out that Section 1914 of
the ICWA states that “any Indian child who is the subject of any action
for foster case placement or termination of parental rights under State
law, any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody was removed,
and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent
jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action
violated any protection of sections 101 [§1911] ,102 [§1912], and 103
[§1913] of this Act.” Id. at 1044. Nonetheless, ICWA does not confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts. Id. at 1045. Thus, the 9th Circuit
used 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in combination with the ICWA to establish
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1045-47.
Second, the 9th Circuit applied the facts of this case to Section
1914 of the ICWA and determined that the facts fell within the
boundaries of the statute. Id. at 1048. The court demonstrated that the
California law involved here, Public Law 280, is one that is adjudicatory
and not regulatory. Id. at 1061. Therefore, the California law for custody
proceedings fits within the legislative intent of the ICWA. Id. at 1064.
CONCLUSION: California’s Public Law 280 creates “concurrent
jurisdiction over dependency proceedings involving Indian children.” Id.
at 1068. Therefore, ICWA applies and the federal court has jurisdiction
in regards to this matter. Id.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether § 106 [of the National Historic Preservation
Act (“NHPA”), currently codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f,] provides a
private right of action against the United States . . . .” Id. at 1093.
ANALYSIS: The San Carlos Apache Tribe in Arizona sought an
injunction against the United States to maintain certain water levels in
the San Carlos Reservoir, thus avoiding proceeding against the federal
government under the Administrative Procedure Act ( “APA”). Id. at
1092. Instead, the Tribe contended that a private right of action existed
under the NHPA that allowed it to forego proceeding administratively
first. Id. at 1093. The 9th Circuit noted that it had previously “assumed”
without deciding that the NHPA did grant a private right of action. Id. at
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1094. The court looked to the recent Supreme Court decision of
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held, under a
similarly situated Civil Rights statute, that Congress must explicitly grant
a private right of action to proceed against the federal government and
that no such implication can be inferred. Id. at 1094-95. The 9th Circuit
reasoned that the APA provides the alternate means by which a private
party can ensure that government officials abide by a statute and thus a
private right of action is not necessary. Id. at 1099.
CONCLUSION: Section 106 of the NHPA does not provide a private
right of action against the United States. Id.
TENTH CIRCUIT
Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) . . .
prohibited the Colorado district court from compelling arbitration in
Colorado when the parties’ contractual agreement designated
Washington, D.C. as the arbitration forum.” Id. at 1215.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that circuit courts are split, taking one
of three basic approaches to resolve this issue. Id. at 1218. The court
explained that the 5th Circuit “has held that a district court may compel
arbitration in the district specified in the arbitration agreement, even
though that district is outside its own district.” Id. The court further
pointed to a second approach, adopted by the 9th Circuit, allowing “the
district court to compel arbitration in its own district and ignore the
forum specified in the arbitration clause.” Id. at 1219. The court
ultimately adopted the majority approach holding that “where the parties
agreed to arbitrate in a particular forum only a district court in that forum
has authority to compel arbitration under § 4.” Id. at 1219-20. The court
found the third approach correct because “any other result renders
meaningless the § 4 mandate that arbitration and the order compelling
arbitration issue from the same district.” Id. at 1220.
CONCLUSION: The court “conclude[d] that § 4 did prohibit the
district court from compelling arbitration in either Colorado or
Washington, D.C.” Id. at 1215.
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Claymore v. United States, 415 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether sovereign immunity bars an award of
monetary damages against the government in a Rule 41(e) action when
the property cannot be returned.” Id. at 1118.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit acknowledged that there is a split
among the circuits with regard to this question. Id. While the 2nd and 9th
Circuits have allowed monetary damages in such a situation, the 3rd, 4th,
5th, 8th and 11th Circuits have not allowed damages when the property
has been destroyed. Id. The 10th Circuit, like a majority of other circuits
that have faced the issue held that “because Rule 41(e) does not contain
the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity required to authorize monetary
relief against the government, [it] deprives a court of jurisdiction to
award damages” when the property has been destroyed. Id. at 1118-19.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit “agree[d] with the majority of the
circuits and conclude[d] [that] sovereign immunity bars monetary relief
in a Rule 41(e) proceeding when the government no longer possesses the
property.” Id. at 1120.
United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a jury, after Apprendi and Booker, must
determine the amount and type of drug attributable to individual
coconspirators rather than simply attributable to the entire conspiracy.”
Id. at 1193.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit stated that, under Apprendi, “‘[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 1192 (quoting
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). However, Apprendi also only sets
the “‘maximum sentence ([i.e., the] ceiling)’ under which each
coconspirator’s sentence must fall,” and “in the conspiracy context, a
finding of drug amounts for the conspiracy as a whole sets the maximum
sentence that each coconspirator [can] be given.” Id. at 1192-93. The
10th Circuit reasoned that “the sentence falls within the statutory
maximum made applicable by the jury’s conspiracy-wide drug quantity
determination,” and that Booker “does not call [the present sentencing]
into question.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit found that the “the jury is not
required to make individualized findings as to each coconspirator
because ‘[t]he sentencing judge’s findings do not, because they cannot,
have the effect of increasing an individual defendant’s exposure beyond
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the statutory maximum justified by the jury’s guilty verdict.’” Id. at
1193.
San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether an intervenor must establish its own Article
III standing as a matter of right. Id.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit began by noting that “because
standing implicates a court’s jurisdiction, it requires a court itself to raise
and address standing before reaching the merits of the case before it.” Id.
at 1205. “Nevertheless, on many occasions the Supreme Court has noted
that an intervenor may not have standing, but has not specifically
resolved that issue, so long as another party to the litigation had
sufficient standing to assert the claim at issue.” Id. For the above reasons,
the court concluded that a party seeking to intervene under FED. R. CIV.
P. 24 “need not establish its own standing, in addition to meeting Rule
24’s requirements, before the party can intervene so long as another party
with constitutional standing on the same side as the intervenor remains in
the case.” Id. at 1206.
CONCLUSION: “[I]ntervenors do not need to establish their own
Article III standing in order to intervene as a matter of right under FED.
R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).” Id. at 1205.
Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the removal provisions of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 [“CAFA”] . . . apply to pending state court cases
that were removed after the effective date of the Act.” Id. at 1090.
ANALYSIS: The plain language of the statute provides that CAFA
applies to civil actions that began on or after the date of CAFA’s
enactment, February 18, 2005. Id. at 1094. The underlying case at bar
was commenced in state court on April 2, 2003. Id. The 10th Circuit
stated that jurisdictional statues “and particularly removal statutes, are to
be narrowly construed in light of our constitutional role as limited
tribunals.” Id. at 1094-95. Further, “Congress initially started out with
broader language that could have included a number of then-pending
lawsuits in state courts. [But b]y excising the House provision, Congress
signaled an intent to narrow the removal provisions of the Act to exclude
currently pending suits.” Id. at 1095.
CONCLUSION: The court did “not have jurisdiction over this appeal
predicated on the Class Action Fairness Act because this action was
commenced prior to the effective date of the Act.” Id. at 1093-94.
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United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Under the Fourth Amendment, whether an arrest
“immediately terminate[s] a search provision in a parole or probation
agreement.” Id. at 1242.
ANALYSIS: The government has a continuing interest in monitoring
parolees, in order to prevent recidivism, and this interest is not subsumed
by an arrest. Id. at 1242-43. The appellant was “incorrect to assert that
the government’s interests [in crime prevention] evaporated at the
moment of his arrest.” Id. at 1244. Finally, “a proper weighing of the
government’s interests in effective supervision and prevention of harm
against [the appellant’s] privacy interests demonstrates that his arrest has
little effect on the calculus. Just as before his arrest, this balance weighs
in favor of the government . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: In a parole or probation agreement, arrest does not
cancel a search provision. Id. at 1244.
In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a Bankruptcy Court has “the power to grant a
partial discharge of student loan debts even in the absence of an undue
hardship.” Id. at 1207.
ANALYSIS: Bankruptcy Courts derive their equitable powers from §
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which grants the power to “carry out the
provisions of this title.” Id. at 1207. The 10th Circuit referred to the
decisions of the 6th, 11th, and 9th Circuits to find that partial discharge
of debt cannot be granted where the terms of the specific provision have
not been met, in this case requiring a showing of undue hardship under §
523(a)(8). Id. at 1207.
CONCLUSION: “A bankruptcy court cannot exercise its § 105(a)
powers to grant a partial discharge of student loans unless § 523(a)(8)
has been satisfied.” Id. at 1207.
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration divests a district court of jurisdiction to
proceed on the merits of the underlying claim while the appeal is pending
. . . .” Id. at 1160.
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ANALYSIS: The court turned to the analysis undertaken by the other
circuit courts that seem to be divided on the issue of whether to grant a
stay pending an appeal from an arbitration dispute. Id. at 1160. The 10th
Circuit aligned itself with the views of the 11th and 7th Circuits which
held that “upon the filing of a non-frivolous § 16(a) appeal, the district
court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved on the
merits.” Id. The court also reasoned that jurisdiction for frivolous appeals
is meant to avoid “potential misuse of interlocutory review.” Id. at 1162.
CONCLUSION: “[U]pon the filing of a motion to stay litigation
pending an appeal from the denial of a motion . . . to compel arbitration,
the district court may frustrate any litigant’s attempt to exploit the
categorical divestiture rule by taking the affirmative step, after a hearing,
of certifying the § 16(a) appeal as frivolous or forfeited.” Id.
United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the district court followed the correct
procedure, under the Supreme Court decision in Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166 (2003), “for involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication to a non-dangerous criminal defendant for the purpose of
rendering him competent to stand trial . . .” Id. at 1114.
ANALYSIS: On appeal, the 10th Circuit analyzed the factual and
legal findings of the district court to determine whether the
administration of drugs was medically appropriate. Id. at 1114. Bradley
argued that the government did not prove it had established no less
intrusive treatment for his condition, but the 10th Circuit disagreed and
found that no other treatment would “achieve substantially the same
results.” Id. at 1115. The 10th Circuit also determined that the
government has important interest in bringing criminals before the
courts. Id. at 1116.
CONCLUSION: Under Sell, a district court can order involuntary
medication of a defendant in order to make him competent to stand trial
if the court properly applied the factors defined by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 1117.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2005), a
federal prisoner is entitled to receive credit toward the service of his
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sentence, beyond the time served, of “fifty-four days . . . for each year he
is sentenced to imprisonment” or whether the credit attaches “for each
year [the prisoner] actually serves in prison.” Id. at 1272. (emphasis in
original)
ANALYSIS: The court decided that the district court’s determination
that § 3624(b)(1) “clearly supports” the interpretation that the fifty-four
days of credit attach for each year the prisoner serves in prison “is
arguably correct.” Id. However, the court chose to follow the holdings of
the five sister circuits addressing this issue, holding the provision is
ambiguous but the interpretation proffered by the district court is a
reasonable one. Id. at 1273.
CONCLUSION: § 3624(b)(1) entitles a federal prisoner to fifty-four
days of credit for each year he serves his prison sentence. Id. at 1272.
McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3)(2005) “applies not
only to exhaustion, but also to a procedural bar that arises out of a failure
to exhaust.” Id. at 1305.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that a procedural bar arises when
the plaintiff does not properly exhaust his state remedies prior to filing a
habeas corpus petition. Id. at 1306. The court noted that § 2254(b)(3)
speaks about exhaustion and not about procedural bars, providing that
“the [s]tate can waive [the plaintiff’s] failure to properly exhaust his
claim only by expressly doing so . . . .” Id. at 1305. However, the court
opined that when a procedural bar occurs because of the plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust his state remedies, § 2254(b)(3) applies, mandating that
the state can waive the procedural bar only if it expressly chooses to. Id.
CONCLUSION: Section 2254(b)(3)’s express waiver requirement
applies to procedural bars arising from plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his
state court remedies. Id. at 1306.
In re Martinez, 416 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the bankruptcy court properly awarded
attorney’s fees and costs to a “prevailing [commercial] debtor in a
dischargeability action brought by his creditor . . .” Id. at 1288.
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that a prevailing litigant in a
federal bankruptcy litigation can only get attorney’s fees if a federal
statute or a contract provides for such an award. Id. Here, the parties’
contract provided that it was governed by Florida law. Id. The contract
further provided that the creditor is entitled to attorney’s fees if he brings
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suit to enforce the contract. Id. The court recognized this provision was
one sided and referred to a Florida law providing that such a provision
must be construed to afford all parties to the contract a right to collect
attorney’s fees where they must bring suit to enforce the contract. Id. at
1288-89.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “a prevailing debtor in a
dischargeability action brought by his creditor can recover his attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in those dischargeability proceedings if recovery
of such are due under an enforceable contractual right, such as a statutory
reciprocal attorney’s fee provision, provided for by state law.” Id. at
1288.
Ortega v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 416 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether [the court has] jurisdiction to review an
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals that determined the status of
an alien under section 202 of the Nicaraguan and Central American
Relief Act of 1997.” Id. at 1349.
ANALYSIS: The court determined that § 202(f) of the Act “clearly
shows that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review” of the
Attorney General’s decision concerning whether an alien has or has not
established that “his status should be adjusted under [the Act] . . .” Id. at
1350.
CONCLUSION: The court held that, “[b]ecause the clear language of
section 202(f) restricts our jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1349.
Williams v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Edison Cmty. College, 421 F.3d 1190
(11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a Florida community college, under the
new education code enacted in January 2003, is an arm of the state,
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 1190.
ANALYSIS: To determine whether a community college is an “arm
of the state” the court looked at four factors: “(1) how the state defines
the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity;
(3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for
judgment against the entity.” Id. at 1192. The court determined that,
though a community college is an arm of the state, this did not “weigh
heavily in [the] analysis.” Id. at 1193. The degree of control of the state
over the community college did weigh heavily towards the college being
an arm of the state, as did the source of funding and the state’s status as
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judgment debtor for judgments entered against the college. Id. at 119394.
CONCLUSION: A Florida community college “is an arm of the state
for purposes of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 1194.
United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether prior juvenile adjudication may be considered
for purposes of increasing appellee’s sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id. at 1188.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the sentencing factor of recidivism
is arguably the most traditional basis for increasing an offender’s
sentence. Id. The court looked at other circuits, the majority of which
have held that when a juvenile is convicted and has received all process
constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, no constitutional problem exists
in using that prior adjudication for purposes of increasing a later
sentence. Id. at 1189-90. The court next agreed that trial by jury is not a
constitutional requisite in juvenile adjudications. Id. at 1190. Under this
paradigm, the court held that the prior adjudication may be considered
for purposes of increasing appellee’s sentence under the ACCA. Id. at
1191.
CONCLUSION: A juvenile adjudication may be a “prior conviction”
under the ACCA where the defendant has been afforded all
constitutionally-required process due in the juvenile adjudication.
United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether Amendment 591 to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provides a basis for reduction in sentence via a § 3553(a)
motion. Id. at 1218-19.
ANALYSIS: Pursuant to a motion under § 3553(a), a court may
“reduce the term of imprisonment . . . to the extent [the factors contained
in the provision] are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
at 1219 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). “Amendment 591 requires that
the initial selection of the offense guideline be based only on the statute
or offense of conviction rather than on judicial findings of actual conduct
not made by the jury.” Id. Although the Amendment “directs the [courts]
to apply the guideline dictated by the statute of conviction [it] does not
constrain the use of judicially found facts to select a base offense level
within the relevant guideline.” Id. at 1219-20. Agreeing with the
reasoning of its sister circuits, the 11th Circuit held that Amendment 591
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governs only the “selection of the relevant offense guideline, not the
selection of a base offense level within the applicable offense guideline .
. . .” Id. at 1220.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately concluded that
“Amendment 591 only applies to the selection of the relevant offense
guideline, not the selection of a base offense level within the applicable
offense guideline . . . .” Id. at 1220.
Kehoe v. Fidelity Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a plaintiff must prove actual damages
before he may recover a liquidated damages award under the [Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”)].” Id. at 1212.
ANALYSIS: The relevant sections of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2722
and 2724, make it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or
disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for [an
unpermitted use.]” Id. at 1212. Turning first to the statutory text, the
court determined that there was “no language in [the provision] that
confines liquidated damages to people who suffered actual damages.” Id.
at 1213. Therefore, “[s]ince liquidated damages are an appropriate
substitute for the potentially uncertain and unmeasurable actual damages
of a privacy violation, it follows that proof of actual damages is not
necessary for an award of liquidated damages.” Id. The 11th Circuit then
pointed to dicta where the Supreme Court suggests that “language similar
to the language in the DPPA [does not create the] prerequisite [of
showing actual damages] to recovering statutory damages.” Id. at 1214
(citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004)). Finally, the 11th Circuit
found that the district court’s application of the rule of the last antecedent
–that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”—was
erroneously applied to the provision at issue. Id. at 1215. (quoting
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2004)).
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that “[a] plaintiff need
not prove actual damages to recover liquidated damages for a violation
of the DPPA.” Id. at 1217.
D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the [Americans with Disabilities Act]’s
reasonable accommodation requirement applies to the regarded-as
category of disabled individuals . . . .” Id. at 1235.
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ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit found that because “a review of the
plain language of the ADA yields no statutory basis for distinguishing
among individuals who are disabled in the actual-impairment sense and
those who are disabled only in the regarded-as sense,” the court would
join the 3rd Circuit in “holding that regarded-as disabled individuals also
are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Finding that “[t]he text of the statute simply offers
no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities in
determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation and
which are not” the court concluded that the “ADA’s plain language . . .
compels [the court] to conclude that the very terms of the statute require
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals it
regards as disabled.” Id. at 1236. Thus, “‘regarded-as’ employees under
the ADA are entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same way as
those who are actually disabled.” Id. at 1237.
CONCLUSION: “Based on the text of this statute and the absence of
any contrary expression of congressional intent, we hold that an
individual falling within the ‘regarded as’ category of disability under the
ADA is entitled to a reasonable accommodation no less than an
individual satisfying the actual-impairment definition of disability.” Id. at
1239.
Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the district court properly determined that the
defendant was not liable to the plaintiff as a ‘successor in interest’ or
‘successor employer’ and, therefore, owed no duty to reemploy the
plaintiff [once he returned from active military duty] under 38 U.S.C. §
4312 (2005) and 38 U.S.C. § 4313 (2005).” Id. at 1234.
ANALYSIS: The court began by identifying the definition of
“employer” as utilized by the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). Id. at 1234. USERRA
does not provide a definition for “successor in interest;” thus, the court
looked to the legislative history and relevant case law for guidance. Id. at
1236. The court gave credence to the factors listed by the 8th Circuit in
Leib v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 925 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1991), but
reasoned that they were only necessary when a merger or transfer of
assets has taken place between the two subject companies. Id. The
foundation of successor liability is the “merger or transfer of assets
between the predecessor and successor companies.” Id. at 1237. Because

240

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:175

Del-Jen and the defendant had neither merged nor transferred assets, the
defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 1239.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately concluded that the
district court made the proper determination. Id. at 1239. The court held
that the defendant was not a “successor in interest’ or “successor
employer,” and therefore USERRA does not apply. Id. at 1232.
United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) should
be classified as a crime of violence for the purpose of career offender
classification . . . .” Id. at 1195.
ANALYSIS: Searcy was convicted of using the internet to induce a
minor into engaging in “unlawful sexual activity.” Id. at 1194. Searcy
was classified as a career offender because of his history of violent
crimes and claimed that his current conviction was not violent in nature.
Id. at 1195. The 11th Circuit disagreed and defined a “crime of violence”
as either a crime with an element of force, or a crime with the potential
risk of injury. Id. Because statutory rape “inherently poses a serious
potential risk of physical injury,” the 11th Circuit affirmed his status. Id.
at 1196 (quoting United States v. Smith, 20 F. App’x. 412 (6th Cir.
2002)).
CONCLUSION: Convictions under § 2422(b) should be considered
crimes of violence for sentencing purposes. Id. at 1198.
Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”)
exhaustion requirement requires simple exhaustion or proper exhaustion
of administrative avenues before a prisoner may bring suit in court. Id. at
1153-54.
ANALYSIS: Johnson, a Georgia state prisoner, sued his prison in
federal court without first following administrative procedure and his suit
was dismissed. Id. at 1154. Johnson then filed a complaint which was
denied for being untimely, and filed again in federal court. Id. The prison
argued that Johnson’s suit was not allowed because he did not truly
exhaust his administrative remedies since he did nothing until the federal
court ordered it and did not appeal his administrative denial. Id. The 11th
Circuit agreed and held that the exhaustion provision “mandates strict
exhaustion” and that all prisoners must first exhaust all internal remedies
before filing in court. Id. at 1155. The 11th Circuit further explained that
any other decision would allow prisoners to “‘evade the exhaustion
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requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally
filing an untimely one . . .’” Id. at 1157. (citing Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d
707 (5th Cir. 1995)).
CONCLUSION: The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires
prisoners to fully exhaust all administrative remedies with good faith
before being able to file a complaint in court. Id. at 1159.
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: When determining diversity jurisdiction, how does a
court determine the “citizenship of a defendant corporation which once
operated in the same state as the plaintiff but has since been purchased
by and integrated into an out-of-state corporation as a holding
company?” Id. at 1237.
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff claimed that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter because the parties were not in complete
diversity with each other at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at 1239.
Specifically, the defendant was an “inactive corporation” at the time of
the suit, and plaintiff claimed that his citizenship remained the same as
when the corporation was active. Id. at 1239. The court determined that
its “total activities test” was appropriate for both active and inactive
corporations, and looked at the principal place of business and nerve
center to determine where citizenship existed at the time of the suit. Id. at
1239. Because defendant was completely inactive in plaintiff’s
jurisdiction at the time the suit was filed, but did business elsewhere, the
court determined that it was not an “inactive corporation” as defined by
other circuits. Id. at 1240. Thus, the Court observed that defendant’s
place of business and nerve center were different than that of the
plaintiff, and complete diversity did exist. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that its “total activities test” was the
correct test to determine the citizenship of an “inactive corporation.” Id.
at 1234.
Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether there is a constitutionally-protected liberty
interest in a mother’s continued relationship with her adult son, under
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Id. at 1255.
ANALYSIS: Reviewing plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for deprivation of
alleged constitutional interests with respect to police causing the death of
plaintiff’s son, the court noted that it was progressing into a “murky area
of unenumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 1256 (citing McCurdy v.
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Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2003)). The 1st, 3rd, 7th, and DC
Circuits had rejected similar claims where the “deprivation was
incidental to the defendant’s actions.” Id. at 1258. The 10th Circuit,
referring to the First Amendment’s right of intimate association, had
upheld a parent’s liberty interest with an adult son. Id. at 1258 n.3. Only
the 9th Circuit had upheld “allowing a parent to bring a companionship
claim in the context of an adult child where the deprivation was
incidental to the state action.” Id. at 1258 n.4. The court rejected
plaintiff’s claim that she had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest
in her relationship with her adult son, finding no Supreme Court
precedent and no reason to further expand protections under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1260.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit would not affirm a parent’s
constitutional right to companionship with an adult son, in the context of
a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1259. The court concluded it is up to the Florida
legislature to determine whether said deprivations are allowable. Id. at
1262.
Siemens Power Trans’n. & Distrib., Inc. v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 420
F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: (1) “[W]hether a shipper’s timely compliance with the
minimum claim filing requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b), a
regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”), is a prerequisite to filing suit against a carrier under the
Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. . . .” Id. at 1245. (2) If the
timely compliance is a requirement, “what standard should be applied to
determine whether a shipper has adhered to the regulation’s requirement
that a claim contain ‘a specified or determinable’ amount of damages, 49
C.F.R. § 1005.2(b).” Id.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that although it had not “expressly held
the ICC minimum claim requirements apply to litigated claims,” in
contrast with voluntarily settled claims, prior holdings had assumed as
much. Id. at 1250. In reviewing how other circuits had treated this
matter, the court determined that all but one circuit to address the issue
had held the requirements to apply to litigated claims. Id. The 1st, 2nd,
and 9th Circuits had held that the ICC regulations apply to contested and
voluntarily settled claims; the 5th and 6th Circuits had applied the ICC
regulations without explicitly holding on the issue; and the 7th Circuit
had concluded that the ICC regulations only apply to the settled claims.
Id. After reviewing the precedent from the other courts, the 11th Circuit
was persuaded by the majority of circuits that 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) did
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govern plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1251. The court further determined that an
exact damages estimate was not needed for plaintiff, as long as the
carrier had enough information to start processing the claim. Id. at 125354.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately reversed the district
court’s decision that the plaintiff did not have a valid claim. Id. at 1254.
While affirming the holding that § 1005.2(b) applied to both litigated and
settled matters, the court disagreed with the lower court’s determination
that the plaintiff had not provided specified damages. Id. The Circuit
construed the statute liberally to hold that the plaintiff’s claim met the
requirements of “specified and determinable” damages because the
damage estimates were in a narrow-enough range. Id.
Centurion Air Cargo v. United Parcel Serv., 420 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: Whether an arbitrator’s order is binding, where the
parties have not expressly agreed that said award is binding and where
the district court has not yet affirmed the award. Id. at 1149.
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the “Supreme Court has
declared a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 1149.
Hence, “[t]o adopt a rule that an arbitral decision is not ‘binding’ and
thus lacks the authority of a conclusive judgment would run counter to
this policy and require all winners in arbitrations to seek affirmation in a
district court.” Id. at 1150.
CONCLUSION: “[W]e agree with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and
hold that an arbitrator’s order is binding on the parties unless they
expressly agree otherwise, and does not require affirmance from a court
to take effect.” Id. at 1150.
Young v. New Process Steel, 419 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “May a district court require, as a condition for
appealing a judgment, that a losing plaintiff in a civil rights case post a
Fed. R. App. P. 7 bond that includes the defendant’s anticipated appellate
attorney’s fees?” Id. at 1202.
ANALYSIS: The appellate court cited to Christiansburg v. Garment
Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978) for the proposition that a “district court should not award
attorney’s fees to a prevailing civil rights defendant absent ‘a finding that
the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.’” Id. at 1205.
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CONCLUSION: “[W]e hold that a district court may not require an
unsuccessful plaintiff in a civil rights case to post an appellate bond that
includes not only ordinary costs but also the defendant’s anticipated
attorney’s fees on appeal, unless the court determines that the appeal is
likely to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at 120708.
London v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 410 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “plaintiffs must show that the unfair,
discriminatory or deceptive practice adversely affected competition in
order to prevail under the [Packers and Stockyards Act] PSA.” Id. at
1302.
ANALYSIS: The Court stated that it must “‘interpret the words of
the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Id.
(quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983)). The 11th Circuit stated that
fair competition and fair trade were the primary purposes of the law and
it was enacted out of a fear of a monopoly by packers. Id. at 1303. The
11th Circuit cited to the 7th Circuit, which reasoned that there was no
evidence that Congress sought to give a more expansive view of the
PSA. Id. Furthermore, the 11th Circuit found that the holdings in the 4th
and 8th Circuits, which state that an “unfair practice” requires an injury
or likelihood of injury, to be persuasive. Id. In light of that Congressional
intent, the Court found, along with the 4th, 7th, and 8th Circuits, that the
actions in question must “adversely affect or be likely to adversely affect
competition.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “In order to prevail under the PSA, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant’s deceptive or unfair practice adversely affects
competition or is likely to adversely affect competition.” Id. at 1304.
United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a prior conviction for the attempted sale of
a controlled substance qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)” and whether deportation terminates
outstanding parole. Id. at 1288.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit looked to the statutory language and
commentary of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to decide whether the
conviction for “attempted sale of a controlled substance” would be
considered a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 1288. Defendant was given a
sixteen-level sentencing enhancement on the theory that his offense was
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within the purview of the drug trafficking statute. Id. at 1291. The court
used the statute’s commentary “that an ‘attempt offense’ can qualify as a
prior drug trafficking offense” and compared a similar holding from the
9th Circuit. Id. at 1292. As for the issue of whether deportation
terminates parole, the court noted the lack of case law supporting the
defendant’s belief and pointed to the 1st Circuit’s rejection of the issue.
Id. at 1292.
CONCLUSION: A previous conviction for attempted sale of a
controlled substance is a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) and defendant’s deportation after his conviction did not
terminate his parole. Id. at 1288-92.
Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. MR23, 412 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether attorney’s fees may be awarded to a salvor in
an in rem action for salvage.” Id. at 1256.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit examined the exceptions for the
general rule that attorney’s fees are not awarded in admiralty cases. Id.
The exceptions for an award of fees occur in cases where there was
either bad faith, breach of warranty of workmanlike performance, and
indemnity situations. Id. at 1256. These exceptions were not present in
this case and the court evaluated the Blackwall factors that were
enumerated by the Supreme Court to determine that attorney’s fees were
not included as to the value or risk of salving the property. Id. at 1257.
CONCLUSION: “Attorney’s fees may not be recovered in an in rem
action to enforce a salvage lien.” Id. at 1258.

